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Abstract
A statistical sample size determination (SSD) method is designed for the maintenance of
engineering components of similar structure within an overall system. The maintenance problem
is defined as a sequential decision-making process, in which the optimal sample sizes are derived
by an approach based on the value of information (VoI) concept.
Firstly, various sample size determination methods are summarized, and their advantages
and disadvantages are discussed. This comparison highlights that, in many cases, the
VoI-based approach is superior to traditionally used methods. Existing standards for engineering
components are then categorized, based on the comparison, and the rationale behind each
standard is described. Potential advantages of using a VoI-based approach are suggested and
discussed.
Secondly, the theoretical superiority of VoI-based methods is demonstrated in the context of
a diagnostic inspection problem, in which the traditional SSD method, the hypothesis-testing
approach, can be defined. After the hypothesis-testing context is translated into a sequential
decision-making problem, theoretical and numerical results are compared for the VoI-based and
traditional methods.
Thirdly, the models for condition-based maintenance problems are defined with a
time-dependent degradation process called the gamma process. The models mathematically
describe how temporal and parameter uncertainties of the degradation process affect VoI-based
analysis. Computational calculation techniques are introduced and compared with each other.
Additionally, the model is generalized as a dynamic programming problem and formulated as a
multiple-inspection problem.
Finally, the effectiveness of the SSD approach is demonstrated through application to an
iv
actual degrading system. Based on data from nuclear power plants, numerical analyses are
shown for both single and two inspection cases. The results provide operators with guidelines for
maintenance and inspection policies that minimize the expected cost throughout the remaining
lifetime of the system.
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As our society matures, the cost of sustaining the built public infrastructure, such as roadways,
bridges, and power plants, becomes enormous. Maintenance techniques for operating repairable
engineering systems are now essential, and effective maintenance strategies are pursued for better
safety and economic benefits. Although a large budget is allocated for infrastructure investment,
still a significant funding gap exists between what is actually needed and the available funding.
For example, according to the American Society of Civil Engineers (2016), federal, state, and
local governments in the US will fund only 57% of the budget required for 2016 to 2025, which
is an estimated 3.3 trillion U.S. dollars. In addition to promoting political efforts to increase the
budget, authorities need to make the cost for infrastructure maintenance as low as possible, but
also compatible with component safety.
In the maintenance of engineering components, which components and when to replace
them are the main concerns and have been addressed by using many optimization approaches.
Maintenance strategies can be roughly classified into two groups: time-based maintenance
and condition-based maintenance. With time-based maintenance, which is sometimes called
age-based replacement, components will be replaced at their scheduled times. This policy
can be understood as an optimized strategy without inspection. Operators make plans based
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not on individual degradation processes, but on a general tendency. Thus, with a time-based
maintenance policy, operators risk replacing components that still have a long remaining lifetime,
which is wasteful. With condition-based maintenance, on the other hand, periodic inspection is
scheduled, and decisions to replace a component or not are based on its inspected condition.
Although time-based maintenance has been the majority choice for decades because of its
easier implementation, condition-based maintenance has recently received attention as monitoring
technologies develop. Pandey et al. (2009) reveal that condition-based maintenance is preferable
when the uncertainty associated with degradation is relatively small, although in some cases
time-based maintenance is better than condition-based maintenance. Most condition-based
maintenance optimization studies propose determining the replacement criteria and inspection
intervals needed for preventive maintenance (PM) based on the assumption that the conditions
of all components are observed at each periodic inspection.
Nuclear power plants are one of the most critical infrastructures to be operated under a
need to balance considerations of safety with those of generation efficiency. In order to remain
operating, plants have to ensure authorities that they satisfy regulatory standards, and so must
undergo inspections by an independent regulator. Sustained and efficient generation is desired
by operating corporations, as it drives profit. To maintain safety and generation efficiency at
high levels simultaneously, each component of a plant is regularly inspected. Usually, a nuclear
power plant has a planned maintenance outage for two to eight weeks every two years (Garland,
2014). By inspecting components, operators can replace only those that are faulty or unlikely
to satisfy required performance until the next inspection outage. Since a nuclear power plant
consists of many sub systems, which comprise a number of components, the probability of failure
for each component should be kept low. Otherwise, the whole system would need to be shut down
often because even failure of one component may affect and stop the whole system. To avoid
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this frustrating situation, during a maintenance outage, components are inspected and those that
have a higher probability of failure are replaced immediately. In terms of safety, the larger the
sample size inspected, the less the uncertainty about current and future states of the components.
However, inspections of nuclear power plant components usually become expensive because
of several difficulties, such as the high-radiation area and the large number of components. For
example, a 600 MWe (electric) CANDU reactor core has 380 fuel channels, which are pressure
tubes (see Figure 1.1 (Garland, 2014)). Once the wall thickness of a single pipe drops below a
set threshold, heavy water leakage can occur. The actual strategy in a maintenance outage is
to inspect only a part of all components and estimate the others’ conditions from the newest
inspection outcomes and previous data. Thus, sample size determination becomes an important
problem in balancing the safety or generating efficiency requirement with management cost.
1.1 Research Motivation
Standards and guidelines for sample size determination (SSD) have been published and used at
actual sites, but they are missing theoretical rationale or rely on methods that ignore inspection
cost. For example, the minimum sample sizes for components of CANDU reactors are summarized
as guidelines (National Standards of Canada, 2014). Although the guidelines have worked well
at actual operating sites, no theoretical rationale exists for the sample sizes and requirements
for sample selection. Several other standards such as National Standards of Canada (2014)
rely on traditional SSD methods, but these methods focus only on safety and cannot include
cost-effectiveness in the inspection policy.
Except for the traditional SSD techniques, few SSD methods have been developed for
condition-based maintenance. Since condition-based maintenance is based on data obtained from
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Figure 1.1: Reactor core of a CANDU 600 (Garland, 2014)
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periodic inspection, SSD is ignored in most studies. The assumption of full-inspection needs
to be revisited to include the inspection problem. As the example points out, there are cases
like nuclear power plants where the sample size of each inspection needs to be considered in the
condition-based maintenance strategy.
An SSD approach, proposed by Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961), called the value of information
(VoI) concept, is gaining attention in structural health monitoring (Faber and Sorensen,
2002; Straub and Faber, 2004a,b; Bensi, 2010; Pozzi and Der Kiureghian, 2011; Straub, 2014;
Memarzadeh and Pozzi, 2016; Konakli et al., 2016). It is used for calculating the benefit of
obtaining information, and with it, operators can find a reasonable balance between the cost
of inspection and the pay-off of the results. Despite noteworthy contributions of these studies,
several limitations remain. First, these studies still have difficulty in dealing with system-level
problems. Thus, SSD cannot be carried out with the existing VoI-based analyses. Second,
these studies are not focused on applying the method to deterioration models and so have been
applied to realistic degradation process models and do not explain how to extend the method to
those degradation models. Third, they fail to show how much the VoI-based method can reduce
the expected cost compared with traditional SSD methods. These studies, relying on Bayesian
statistics, use different terminologies from frequentist statistics, making comparisons difficult.
As another approach for an inspection decision problem, the partially observable Markov
decision process (POMDP) has been developed for condition-based maintenance in recent years
(Papakonstantinou and Shinozuka, 2014a,b,c; Memarzadeh and Pozzi, 2016). The approach
focuses on measurement errors and optimizes not only maintenance actions but also inspection
policy. It successfully generalizes multiple-inspection problems by simplifying the states of a
system, observation outcomes, and maintenance/inspection actions as discrete values. Schöbi and
Chatzi (2016) extend the POMDP for continuous-state problems. However, it still cannot deal
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with the SSD problem in the analysis scheme because it has focused only on a single-component
system. Moreover, it has not considered other types of uncertainties, such as parameter and
temporal uncertainties.
1.2 Objectives
The overall goal of this thesis is to develop widely applicable SSD methods for investigating
system-level condition-based maintenance problems, and thus enhance decision-making for
engineering-component maintenance. In particular, the thesis covers the following questions and
approaches to solving them:
• What are the basic characteristics of SSD methods based on VoI concept within the context
of engineering-component maintenance problems? The author develops a simple model that
represents the maintenance problem and shows how the VoI-based SSD methods work;
• How do the proposed SSD methods differ from frequentist techniques? The author compares
these two approaches and shows the strengths and weaknesses of each;
• How can a system-level maintenance problem be defined for a time-dependent degradation
process? The author applies a stochastic degradation process modelled as a gamma process,
with which one can include temporal and parameter uncertainties. Because of the nature
of the process, one can describe all possible system conditions in a simple manner. Note
that the system is defined as a group of homogeneous components whose degradation levels
can be treated as independent and identically distributed random variables, although they
become dependent once their distribution parameters share a common parameter. The
system is repairable, and each component can be replaced;
• How can an SSD method be applied to multiple-component multiple-inspection problems?
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The author explains how to combine the SSD method with dynamic programming. As an
example, the VoI-based method is demonstrated with data from a real operating system.
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1.3 Thesis Overview
The thesis organization is illustrated in Figure 1.2. The thesis is organized in the following
manner.
• Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature on SSD methods, discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of each technique, and confirms the superiority of the VoI-based SSD method.
• Chapter 3 provides an SSD analysis for diagnostic inspection of a component population.
An inspection and replacement problem is defined and is combined with a binomial states
model. This chapter provides hypothesis-testing-based and VoI-based methods for finite
population cases, compares these two methods, and discusses their differences.
• In Chapter 4, the VoI-based SSD method is applied to a linear degradation process model,
a random rate model. First, a two-stage decision-making problem is defined, and the
VoI-based SSD method is formulated for both single-component and multiple-component
system cases. A numerical example is demonstrated, and the characteristics of the method
are analysed.
• Chapter 5 deals with a gamma process model, which is a time-dependent stochastic
degradation, in maintenance problems with temporal uncertainties. It starts with a
single-component case and develops it into a multiple-component system case. The author
demonstrates the given approach on a realistic numerical example of maintenance of nuclear
power plant components.
• Chapter 6 extends the model developed in Chapter 5 to a case with parameter uncertainty.
A single-component case is introduced and used to define a multiple-component system
case. The author also discusses the impacts of reducing different types of uncertainties:
temporal and parameter uncertainties.
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• Chapter 7 extends the proposed model to the two-inspection problem by formulating it as a
dynamic programming situation. It derives a general model for multi-inspection problems
and demonstrates a two-inspection problem with data from a real operating system.
• Chapter 8 summarizes the contributions of the research and points out avenues to follow in
future work.




This chapter reviews the relevant literature on sample size determination (SSD) methods. The
SSD methods were originally developed as a part of statistical experimental design in the early
twentieth century. Since sample size is a key factor of frequentist statistic analysis such as
hypothesis-testing and parameter estimation, as a part of designing these analyses, a variety
of SSD methods were derived. These methods have been widely used for a long time and are
still in the major approach of SSD. Although it is still in the minority, another SSD method,
VoI-based method, has been getting attention over the last decade. These methods have developed
independently and have never been compared with one another. This chapter summarises these
methods and builds a basis for comparison.
2.1 Uncertainties and Random Variables in Degradation
Processes
Inspection data contribute to reducing uncertainties about component deterioration. The
uncertainties can be categorized into three types: measurement error, temporal uncertainty, and
random effects (Verbeke and Molenberghs, 2009; Yuan, 2007). In addition to these three, in the
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context of Bayesian statistics, we need to include parameter uncertainty, which is an uncertainty
in a underlying mathematical model. First, measurement error is a gap between observed data
and the true state of the same component at the same time. This uncertainty is dominant
when we estimate the current states of inspected pipes. Second, temporal uncertainty means
uncertainty for a future state. Even though we know the true current state, future states cannot
be predicted exactly since the degradation process is stochastic. This temporal uncertainty needs
to be considered when estimating the future states of inspected pipes. Third, random effects
represent the heterogeneity of a pipe compared with other pipes that should have the same
characteristics theoretically. Random effects appear in problems estimating other pipes based
on the data of already-inspected pipes. Parameter uncertainty represents imperfect information
about population parameters, which are treated as random variables in the context.
Uncertainties can be classified into two groups: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory uncertainties
arise from natural or unpredictable variation and are in general not reducible, whereas epistemic
uncertainties are from lack of knowledge about the focusing random variables and can be reduced
by increasing inspection accuracy and/or the size of sampling inspection. Measurement error and
parameter uncertainty are classified as epistemic uncertainties, and temporal uncertainty and
random effect are aleatory uncertainties.
Under the context of inspection planning, operators can “reduce” temporal uncertainties
by planning a new inspection at a future time. Adding another decision-making time and
inspecting components, the operators can reduce the time interval in which they need to forecast
the degradation process of the components. In the inspection planning, both the aleatory and
epistemic uncertainties need to be considered.
11
2.2 Degradation Process
The object of inspection is to observe the condition of a component that is degrading during
system operation. Obtained outcomes update information about the degradation process and
consequently contribute to better prediction of future conditions. For the prediction, operators
select and use a mathematical degradation model, which is essential for maintenance planning.
The overall classification of degradation models is illustrated in Figure 2.1. Probabilistic
degradation models can be generally classified into two groups: random variable and stochastic
process models. The random variable models assume that the randomness exists among
components, but the path of degradation process is deterministic. The randomness is represented
by vector of random variables. Thus, they do not include aleatory uncertainties so that the future
condition can be precisely predicted if no measurement errors exist in the observation of current
contritions. The stochastic process models include temporal uncertainties, which are aleatory
uncertainties, and are associated with progression of degradation over time. The process itself
includes uncertainties so that a future is still uncertain even if the current state is observed without
measurement errors. Note that the models satisfy the Markov property as long as they assume
independent increments, which is more restrictive than the Markov property (van Noortwijk,
2009).
The stochastic process models can be split into two subgroups based on whether they
assume discrete or continuous states. Discrete-state models are classified as discrete-time
Markov processes, which discretize time and consequently have discrete-states. The deterioration
progression is modelled as transitions between states that are defined by probability matrix. The
models are usually used in the Markov decision process (MDP) or its derivation, the partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP). The continuous-state models, which are identical
to continuous-time Markov processes, are vary, such as the gamma process, the Wiener process
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Figure 2.1: Classification of degradation models
(also called the Gaussian process or the Brownian motion with drift,) and the inverse-Gaussian
process (Ye et al., 2015).
A gamma process is a continuous-time Markov process with stationary, independent, and
gamma distributed increments (Abdel-Hameed, 1975). With a gamma process, the distribution
of a future state follows a gamma distribution wherein one of the parameters is proportional to
a time interval between the two inspection timings. Because of their simple mathematical form
and memoryless property, gamma processes have been used in modelling a variety of degradation
phenomena (Yuan, 2007). Large applicability of gamma processes has been shown, including
for diverse materials and failure modes, such as sand nourishment erosion (van Noortwijk and
Peerbolte, 2000), rock rubble displacement in sea bed protection (van Noortwijk et al., 1995),
concrete creep (Cinlar et al., 1977), scour-hole development on concrete surface (van Noortwijk
and Klatter, 1999), corrosion of carbon steel pressure vessels (Kallen and van Noortwijk, 2005),
fatigue crack growth (Lawless and Crowder, 2004), feeder wall thinning corrosion (Yuan et al.,
2008), and diameter expansion of fuel channels (Yuan et al., 2006).
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When the increments follow a normal distribution, the continuous-time Markov process is
the Wiener process (van Noortwijk, 2009). Although the Brownian motion, with which the
increments can be negative values, is inadequate for modelling the deterioration process, because
of mathematical advantages, the Wiener process has been widely used in a wide range of
applications such as bridge beam degradation (Wang, 2010) and magnetic head wearing (Ye
et al., 2013).
Similar to the gamma process, the inverse-Gaussian process is a monotonically increasing
degradation process with independent and inverse-Gaussian distributed increments. The process
is flexible for modelling heterogeneous degradation of systems because of its easiness to include
random effects. The inverse-Gaussian process was first introduced by Wang and Xu (2010) and
has gained attention recently. The usefulness of the process for condition-based maintenance,
especially for heterogeneous system, has been investigated by Qin et al. (2013), Ye and Chen
(2014), Chen et al. (2015), and Peng et al. (2017).
2.3 Value of Information Analysis
The value of information concept is defined in Bayesian decision analysis. Bayesian decision
analysis can be understood as a branch of statistical decision theory. Building on game theory,
which was originally proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), Wald (1950) initiated
and developed the statistical decision theory. In the theory, a decision maker plays a game
against an opponent, “nature.” Nature controls randomness in the decision problem, and the
decision maker takes an action through calculating possible consequences and their probability
of occurrence. Since then, statistical decision theory has been introduced, and extended by many
researchers, such as Blackwell and Girshick (1954), Chernoff and Moses (1959), Ferguson (1967),
Hadley (1967), Weiss (1961), and DeGroot (1970). In certain of these studies, Bayesian decision
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analysis, including the VoI concept, was proposed, by Pratt et al. (1995), Raiffa and Schlaifer
(1961), and Schlaifer (1959). Since then Bayesian decision analysis has been applied to many
fields, including civil engineering problems; one initial study of civil engineering applications was
produced by Benjamin and Cornell (1970). The use of VoI and its derivations has become frequent
over this last decade, especialy in healthcare science (Steuten et al., 2013).
VoI is a value for a given observation result, and its expected value with respect to
as-yet-unknown obtaining inspection outcomes is called the expected value of sample information
(EVSI). The EVSI is a function of sample size and represents by how much the decision maker
benefits from the observed data because that data reduces uncertainty about a component’s true
state. The EV SI has the following attributes:
• is an expected value of the VoI;
• treats the observation outcomes as probabilistic variables;
• is a function of one or more parameters of inspection, such as sample size;
• identifies an operator’s expected benefit from observed data.
As a utility function against sample size, the expected net gain of sampling (ENGS) is defined as
EVSI minus observation cost. Maximizing ENGS, we can determine the optimal sample size.
2.3.1 Random Variables and Sets of Options
Typical Bayesian pre-posterior decision analysis is shown in Figure 2.2, which pictures the whole
decision process, relations among the four key variables, and consequences for each possible set
of four values. The terminal cost C(e, z, a, x) is determined by four values (e, z, a, x) from four
data sets: the set of possible experiments (E), the set of potential outcomes of all experiments
in the set (Z), the set of possible terminal acts (A), and the set of possible “states of the world”
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(X). Note that E and A are the set of possible options for a decision maker, and Z and X are
treated as random variables in this study. Using z (results of e), the decision maker updates the
estimate of x and chooses an action, a, because it maximizes the expected terminal cost. Even
though the true state is pre-determined by chance, the node for x comes last because the decision
maker is only able to know the true value through a consequence of his/her decision.
In Bayesian pre-posterior analysis, the terms “prior” and “posterior” mean before and after
experiments, respectively, and “pre-posterior” is used when we are considering a posterior
situation but are actually still in a prior situation. Bayesian pre-posterior decision analysis is
an optimization of the whole decision problem from the perspective of a decision maker before
observations. In detail, this analysis is done to find the options of e and a that minimize the
expected cost related to unknown values z and x.
2.3.2 Cost Function
The cost function can be separated into two parts as follows:
C(e, z, a, x) = C(a, x) + Cost(e, z), (2.1)
where C(a, x) is the re-defined “cost function,” which is used in most VoI analysis and also used
in Chapter 3; and Cost(e, z) is the total inspection cost; for instance, a simple model is a linear
function of a sample size, n, as Cost(e, z) = Cost(n) = n · CI , where CI is the cost for an
observation. For later analysis, we also define “prior cost” as a cost without experiment and
“posterior cost” as a cost in a case with a certain e and z, excluding the cost for the experiment;
respectively, the two are represented as C(a, x) and C(a, x | e, z) in Figure 2.2. Within this
Bayesian pre-posterior analysis, EVSI can be calculated with two different expected costs.
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Figure 2.2: Extended decision tree for a Bayesian pre-posterior analysis
2.3.3 Prior Analysis
A prior analysis is the optimisation of the expected cost with respect to actions, A, without any
new information. Decision makers evaluate the expected cost of each action based only on prior
information, EX [C(a,X)]. The prior information is summarized as a probability density (or
mass) function; this is called a prior distribution. There are no updates about unknown values,
X. Through the analysis, decision makers obtain the best action and its expected consequence,
mina{EX [C(a,X)]}, without sampling inspection.
2.3.4 Posterior Analysis
A posterior analysis is the optimization of expected cost with respect to A when decision makers
have specific outcomes, such as Z = z, from a sampling inspection, E = e. Decision makers use
z to update information about the unknown values, X. Combined the obtained outcomes with a
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prior distribution of X, a posterior distribution is derived. This updating can be calculated with
the classical Bayes rule:
P [X = x | Z = z] = P [Z = z | X = x]P [X = x]
P [Z = z]
, (2.2)
where P [X = x | Z = z] is a posterior probability that a random variable X becomes a value x,
which means that X = x; P [X = x] is a prior probability of X = x; P [Z = z] is a probability
of the occurrence of Z = z; and P [Z = z | X = x] is the probability of the occurrence of Z = z
conditional on X = x, which is called a likelihood. If we treat only the observation Z = z as
fixed, P [Z = z] is also a constant value; we can then re-write Equation (2.2) as a function of x
as follows:
fX|Z(x | z) = L(x | Z = z) · fX(x) · const, (2.3)
where fX|Z(x | z) is a posterior distribution; fX(x) is a prior distribution; and L(x | Z = z) is
a likelihood function, equalling P [Z = z | x]. Note that the likelihood function is L(x | Z = z),
not l(Z = z | x), since it is a function of x, not Z = z, although the form is derived from
P [Z = z | x]. Decision makers can thus derive the best action and its expected consequence,
mina EX|z [C(a,X | e, z)].
2.3.5 Pre-posterior Analysis
Pre-posterior analysis is an optimization of the whole decision problem at the time of inspection
planning. Decision makers can observe additional samples, thereby reducing his/her uncertainty
of the true state, X, and want to minimize the expected cost with respect to inspection options, E.
As the sample size increases, the expected cost decreases. By incorporating the as-yet-unknown
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sampling inspection outcome, we obtain the expected cost: EZ
[
mina EX|z [C(a,X | e, z)]
]
. This
analysis determines the options of e and a that minimize expected costs on unknown values Z
and X.
Comparison between the expected cost with and without the additional observation is called
the Expected Value of Sample Information (EVSI); this comparison represents the additional
expected benefit from the observations. EVSI is described as a function of a sample size, n, as
follows:
EV SI(n) = min
a




EX|z [C(a,X | e, z)]
]
. (2.4)
Since EVSI is an expected value prior to additional observations, the second term is an expectation
for both an uncertain event and the as-yet-unknown observations.
2.3.6 Expected Net Gain of Sampling (ENGS)
While a larger sample size helps to estimate the true state of the world, the observations involve
more costs as the sample size increases. Extracting the observation cost from EVSI, we define
another net benefit as the Expected Net Gain of Sampling (ENGS):
ENGS(n) = EV SI(n)− nCI (2.5)
where CI is the cost for each sample observation. This ENGS is a function of sample size n, and
we estimate the optimal sample size that maximizes the ENGS.
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A more-detailed definition is as follows:
ENGS(n) = min
a


















{C(a, x | n, sn)fX|z(x | e, z)dx}
]
fZ(z | z)dz, (2.6)
where EX|z [g(X)] is an expectation of g(X) on X, conditional on a given condition of Z = z;
and fX|z(x | e, z) is a posterior probability density or mass function of a random variable, X,
conditional on e and z. Since ENGS is an expected value prior to new observations, the second
term is an expectation for both an uncertain event and the as-yet-unknown observations. This
ENGS is a function of sampling inspection options, that is, n in the N component problem, and
we estimate the optimal sample size that maximizes the ENGS.
2.4 Sample Size Determination Methodologies
SSD methods that are used for decision-making problems are classified here based on the ideas
behind the methods. A typical separation criterion is whether the method uses a Bayesian
approach or not. In statistics, researchers have argued for more than a hundred years, divided by
their basic stances: frequentist or Bayesian (McGrayne, 2011). A frequentist treats probability as
frequency after infinite trials, or a large sample size, and considers that unknown parameters are
fixed values, and data is just an appearance of the value with randomness. On the other hand, a
Bayesian assumes that given data is a set of definite values, and unknown parameters can only
be estimated based on the data. A Bayesian treats probability as a subjective expression for an
unknown value based on known information. In that sense, Bayesian statistics has an affinity for
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decision-making problems.
Based on the main idea behind them, SSD methods are classified into three groups,
according to their principles: optimal sample size maximizing expected utility, minimum sample
size satisfying given requirements (frequentist), and minimum sample size satisfying given
requirements (Bayesian). The first group takes a Bayesian approach; the methods in this group
use prior knowledge and new observations. The second group uses a frequentist approach; the
methods do not consider prior information but use given safety criteria. The third group combines
prior information with some safety criteria. Comparing these three groups, this chapter provides
an overview of this research.
2.4.1 Value of Information Approach (Bayesian)
As a straightforward requirement for SSD, considering expectations of random variables, the
utility maximization approach finds the optimal sample size that minimizes a total cost or
maximizes a total value. This is a fully Bayesian approach, which is needed to determine a
utility function (Adcock, 1997; Lindley, 1997). With a fully Bayesian method, sample size is
determined by maximizing the expected utility; for example, Lindley (1997) demonstrates a
method for maximizing a logarithmic utility function. The SSD method with VoI concept can be
classified as a utility maximization approach.
Several studies have applied the VoI concept in structural health monitoring (Faber and
Sorensen, 2002; Straub and Faber, 2004a,b; Bensi, 2010; Pozzi and Der Kiureghian, 2011; Straub,
2014; Memarzadeh and Pozzi, 2016; Konakli et al., 2016). For example, inspection optimization
methods can combine a fatigue-crack-growth model with the VoI concept (Madsen, 1997; Straub,
2014). Straub and Faber (2004a) propose an approach to determine what percentage of the
inspection should be performed with EVSI analysis.
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Despite the large potential of contributing to component-maintenance problems, the method
is still not generalized for condition-based maintenance since its calculation is computationally
expensive. Thus, a variety of simplified models have been proposed, whose major characteristics
are summarized in Table 2.1. Most avoid complexities by simplifying the system to a
single-component (Pozzi and Der Kiureghian, 2011; Straub, 2014; Konakli et al., 2016) and/or by
simplifying degradation processes as descretized conditions with transition among them (Faber
and Sorensen, 2002; Straub and Faber, 2004a,b; Memarzadeh and Pozzi, 2016).
The studies for single-component systems focus on optimizing the timing and threshold
of maintenance actions by using inspection data. Konakli et al. (2016) have challenged
the full-inspection assumption in condition-based maintenance by using a partially observable
Markov decision process (POMDP) recently developed for condition-based maintenance
(Papakonstantinou and Shinozuka, 2014a,b,c; Memarzadeh and Pozzi, 2016). The approach
focuses on measurement errors and optimizes not only maintenance actions but also inspection
policy. It successfully generalizes multiple-inspection problems by discretizing the values of
system states, observation outcomes, and maintenance/inspection actions. However, the study
still cannot deal with SSD problems in the analysis scheme because it focuses only on a
single-component system. Moreover, it ignores other types of uncertainties, such as parameter
and temporal ones.
Studies extending the VoI concept to multiple-component problems have struggled to
overcome the computational cost of integrating all possible inspection outcomes, since the space
of the outcome becomes n dimensional if we identify each component’s outcome separately.
To reduce the number of possible outcomes, these studies use discretized inspection outcomes.
Several studies use binary inspection outcomes: failure detected or not (Faber and Sorensen, 2002;
Straub and Faber, 2004a,b). Memarzadeh and Pozzi (2016) apply POMDP to a five-component
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inspection problem; however, they have not discussed how to find the optimal sample size.
Thus, few related studies focus on SSD. Straub and Faber (2005) proposed a method to reflect
the dependency of inspection costs on the number of inspected hot spots, using EVSI as an
evaluation criterion. The authors discuss how the number of inspected hot spots affects the EVSI
but do not analyse their results in terms of SSD. Several other studies in inspection planning have
calculated and analysed the EVSI or VoI in their decision-making problems, but they do not focus
on finding a best sample size. For example, Madsen et al. (1986) combines a fatigue-crack-growth
model with a failure-probability updating feature to produce an inspection optimization method.
Straub (2014) also provides how to derive the EVSI with a fatigue-crack-growth model. The
author compared the cases of one and two measurement(s) on a component and showed how
the measurement error influences the results. In contrast to the physical models, Pozzi and Der
Kiureghian (2011, 2012) apply the VoI concept to a linear degradation model, and the VoI for
each possible posterior regression covariance matrix is calculated as a demonstration. Several
studies apply VoI-based analysis for observation location planning (Krause, 2008; Yoshida, 2015).
Yoshida (2015) proposes an optimizing method for determining inspection locations and a sample
size, by means of a Gaussian random field. These location planning studies have potential uses
in considering the correlation among different components, although this approach has not yet
been discussed in the literature.
Despite implementation of VoI concept in various applicable fields, two limitations remain.
First, they focus on finding the best investigation interval, not the best sample size. Second, they
are not aimed at applying the method to a variety of deterioration models; how to apply the
method to other cases is not clearly explained. Thus, SSD with VoI concept needs to be modelled
and built in a simple form with degradation process models, within the engineering context.
Moreover, all the previous studies have focused on parameter uncertainties and/or
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Table 2.1: Major characteristics of studies
Study Number of Degradation Observation Decision points
components model result in time
Faber and Sorensen (2002) Single No growth (binomial states) Discrete Single
Straub and Faber (2004a) Multiple Random variable (lognormal) Discrete Multiple (two)
Straub and Faber (2004b) Multiple Random variable (crack growth) Discrete Multiple (two)
Pozzi and Der Kiureghian (2011) Single No growth (multinomial states) Continuous Single
Straub (2014) Single Random variable (crack growth) Continuous Multiple (two)
Mamarzadeh and Pozzi (2016) Multiple Markov process Discrete Multiple
Konakli et al. (2016) Single Random variable (linear) Continuous Single
measurement errors and not on temporal uncertainties in their models. As described in Section
2.1, under the context of inspection planning, even temporal uncertainties can be reduced by
setting a new inspection time. The POMDP approach includes temporal uncertainties as the
transition probabilities between each time step; however, no studies evaluates the value of reducing
the temporal uncertainties.
Procedure for Sample Size Determination with Value of Information Concept
A simple maintenance problem within engineering context is illustrated in Figure 2.3. The
procedure for SSD with VoI concept is as follows:
1. Prior analysis
a Calculate the expected cost for each action, a.
b Choose the best action, ao.
2. Posterior analysis
24
Figure 2.3: Extended decision tree for a maintenance problem as a Bayesian pre-posterior analysis
c Suppose an observation result, Z = z, is given, then calculate the expected cost for
each action, az.
d Choose the best action, aoz, for each possible observation outcome, z.
3. Pre-posterior analysis
e Consider all possible observation outcomes z ∈ Z and take the expected value of the
cost with aoz, which is the optimal action conditional on z.
f Calculate EV SI(n).
g Calculate ENGS(n).
h Find the sample size n that maximizes the ENGS(n).
2.4.2 Statistical Hypothesis-Testing Approach (Frequentist)
The main idea of the widely used hypothesis-testing approach is to derive a minimum sample size
that satisfies required statistical error limits. For example, for given Type I and type II errors,
and a gray region (where the two types of errors are not satisfied), a minimum required sample
size has been derived by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006). Note that the type
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I and II errors mean false positive and false negative errors. Details of this approach are further
explained in Section 3.4. Comprehensive details of this approach are described by Cochran G.
(1977), Kraemer and Thiemann (1988), and Desu and Raghavarao (1990). In this section, we
introduce the hypothesis-testing approach with these criteria.
Note that we generalize the frequentist SSD approaches to “hypothesis-testing approach”
although frequentist approaches can be used in two different contexts: hypothesis-testing and
confidence interval estimation. The SSD methods in confidence interval estimation can be treated
as an SSD in hypothesis testing without any restriction on type II errors, in terms of mathematical
calculation. Because operators are concerned only with whether the condition satisfies required
safety criteria in maintenance problems, we introduce only one-sided hypothesis testing cases.
Although these studies have been applied to several practical problems, there are two critical
limitations. First, they cannot consider consequences resulting from sampling. inspection and
maintenance costs do not affect the sample size. Second, this approach cannot combine prior
information in a systematic manner.
With Required Threshold for Type I and II Errors
Suppose we need to estimate an unknown true value under two safety requirements for type I
and II errors. The larger the sample size we observe, the more certainty we have for a decision
based on the observed data. That is, the sample size increases, we have a smaller region in which
the two safety requirements are not satisfied, which is called a “critical region” or “gray region.”
Once the maximum acceptable width of the critical region is given as the third criterion, we
can determine the minimum sample size that satisfies the three restrictions (U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2006). Let x be the unknown true value. At this point, we do not have to
consider how the random variable is distributed, but will return to this issue in a later chapter.
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Let Y be a random variable that represents the observed sample value; as a typical example, we
use sample mean. This random variable contains measurement errors, and is written as
Y = x+ E, (2.7)
where E follows a normal distribution, N(ε; 0, σ2ε ). We consider that Y follows normal
distribution with the mean at x and the variance at σε. The variance can be known or unknown;
each case has a different formula for SSD. Respectively, the null hypothesis and alternative
hypothesis are
H0 : x ≤ ρF
H1 : x > ρF . (2.8)
We can set a safety criteria, α, for the maximum acceptable probability of rejecting H0 in error
when H0 is true, which is called “type I error.” Similarly, we can set β as the maximum acceptable
probability, erroneously not rejecting H0 when x = xb − d, which means H1 is true (a type II
error). Let U denote the sample mean of the random variable Y . The sample mean also follows
a normal distribution, with mean x and variance σ2ε /n.
The following subsections introduce sample size determination methods for known and
unknown cases. We start from the known variance case as it is simpler, and increase the
complexity by changing the assumption of known variance.
With known variance We assume that the variance of measurement error is known. We want
to ensure that the estimation of the true value, x, is reasonably larger than a failure threshold,
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= Z + e(x), (2.9)
where Z follows standardized normal distribution; and e(x) is a function of x, which is defined




. With the required probabilities of false positive, α, and false negative, β, the
required minimum sample size is estimated as in the following procedure. We may want to find
the minimum sample size such that
• The test hypothesis is falsely rejected with a probability of no greater than α, and
• Failure to reject the null hypothesis happens with a probability of no greater than β when
the difference between the hypothetical population mean and the true population mean is
as large as d.
The two requirements are summarized as an equation:
Pr [Do not reject H0 | H1 is true] = β ⇔ Pr [Z0 ≤ z1−α | x = ρF + d] = β
⇔ Pr [Z + e(ρF + d) ≤ z1−α] = β
⇔ Pr [Z ≤ z1−α − e(ρF + d)] = β, (2.10)
where z1−α is the 1− α percentile value for the standardized normal distribution; d is a positive
value defined as d ≡ x− ρF , which is called the width of the critical region. The equation (2.10)
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can be modified so:
−z1−β = zβ = z1−α − e(ρF + d)












The meaning of this formula is illustrated in Figure 2.4. For each x, we can draw a probability
density function, f(y). The probability of error should be less than α or β when x ≤ SL or x > SL,
respectively; otherwise, the region in which the probability of error exceeds these criteria should
be in a critical region with the width of d.
With unknown variance For the unknown variance case, we test the same hypotheses (null













= T (n− 1) + e′(x)
≈ Z + e′(x), (2.13)
where s2ε is the sample variance; T follows the Students t-distribution with the degree of freedom
at n − 1; and e′(x) is a function of x. The approximation in the last line is only reasonable
when n is large enough. With the required probabilities of false positive, α, and false negative,
β, the required minimum sample size is estimated using the following procedure. If the mean is
x = ρF+d instead of ρF , then the statistic, t0, has a noncentral t-distribution with a non-centrality
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of a critical region with α = 0.05 and β = 0.2
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, where σε is not the sample standard deviation, sε, but rather
the population standard deviation for the random variable Y ; this variance is still unknown and








where σu is a known upper bound for the unknown σε. This formula cannot be calculated directly
because of the contradictory scenario; the critical value for t-distribution needs a degree of freedom
prior to calculating of the minimum sample size. Owen provides tables that identify the required
sample size where α, β, and ∆ = dσε are set (Owen, 1962). However, this procedure has two
disadvantages: (a) the tables are required and (b) there is a probability that a false positive, α,
need to be one of the four values used in the table.
A method used to overcome these disadvantages is Stein’s two-stage sampling scheme (Stein,
1945). Desu and Raghavarao (1990) describe the two stage t-test in four steps:
• Obtain an initial sample of size n1(> 2). Let s21 be the variance of this sample.










, where bac is the maximum integer that does not exceed a.
• Take n− n1 additional observations.
Note that we use n and n1 differently in deriving the critical region of a one-sided α-level test,
d, for testing H0 : x = ρF against the alternative, H1 : x > ρF , giving a power of statistics of at
least 1− β at x = ρF + d as





where u is the sample mean of sample size, n. Through the above steps, an initial sample size
converges to the proper sample size when the initial sample size is smaller than the proper size.
As another method to calculate the minimum sample size, an approximation of the procedure
used to estimate the sample size has been suggested. This method, used by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (2006), assumes that a new random variable, W = E(Y )+kS,












of deriving the equation were originally described in Eisenhart et al. (1947) and explained well
















where we use the approximation of σ2ε ≈ s2ε , which is reasonable when n is large enough. We
do not use two sample cases in this thesis. Applications of this normality approximation for a
variety of cases are shown in Guenther (1981) and Schouten (1999).
With Required Level of Significance
Consider a situation in which we need to estimate an unknown true value under two safety
requirements on type I error and its critical region. This situation can represent SSD for a
confidence interval. Let x be the unknown true value. The problem itself is the same as that
in the previous subsection; we use the same hypotheses. Similarly, let Y be a random variable
that represents the observed sample mean and follow the normal distribution with its mean and
variance at x and σ2y = σ
2
z/n, respectively. Note that σ
2
z is the variance of individual samples. We
can set a required level of significance at α; the critical region is Z < zα, where Z = (Y −xb)/(σy).
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⇔ ycr = xb + zασy. (2.17)
If the sample mean is lower than xcr, operators can reject H0 with α level of significance, and,
consequently, they will take a2, no-action. Otherwise, they should take a1, replacement.
Remember we have the second safety criteria d, the difference between the population mean,
x, and the sample mean, Y . If we assume x = xb is true, we get the SSD equation as follows:












2.4.3 Hypothesis-Testing Approach with Bayesian Probability Updating
The Bayesian approach also offers SSD methods that identify the minimum sample size needed to
satisfy given requirements. This approach uses safety criteria that are compared with an average
variability of the updated probability density/mass distribution (posterior distribution), such as
an average confidence interval of a sample mean. Taking the expectation of values related to
a posterior distribution, a decision maker calculates a minimum sample size that meets given
requirements for the expected values. The main difference from the frequentist approach is that
the Bayesian one uses a prior distribution of an unknown parameter and a likelihood function of
data. Comprehensive introductions to these diverse SSD models are provided by Adcock (1997)
and Pham-Gia and Turkkan (1992). Later Khalifa et al. (2012) extended this method to a finite
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population corrosion inspection problem and derived a closed form formula. As another type of
combined approach, Xing et al. (2016) proposed a sample size determination method based on
Bayesian sequential testing. These approaches still fail to overcome one limitation: they cannot
take cost into consideration in a decision-making problem.
Type I error for the mean value, α, and its interval width, l, are used to restrict the acceptable
variance of the posterior distribution within three methods: the average coverage criterion (ACC),
the average length criterion (ALC), and the worst outcome criterion (WOC). For these methods, l
and α are pre-required. With ACC, a covered area of the posterior distribution with l is calculated,
and the sample size is determined as the covered area becomes more than 1−α percent of all when
l covers the distribution properly, which is called the highest posterior density (HPD) interval.
With ALC method, l′(x) is derived as the covered area that equals 1−α percent of all when l′(x)
is HPD, and then the sample size is chosen, as the expectation of l′(x) is less than l. With WOC,
the worst case is taken into consideration instead of the expectation about observations. For a
normal mean with a known variance case, these three methods (ACC, ALC and WOC) derive
the same sample size (Adcock, 1988, 1997). Pham-Gia and Turkkan (1992) suggest three more
methods for deriving the minimum sample size needed to satisfy given requirements: 1) they use
the posterior variance as a requirement for SSD instead of l and α, 2) they set the maximum
acceptable posterior cost, 3) they set the minimum requirement for EVSI, although observation
cost is not considered in the analysis.
2.5 Comparing Sample Size Determination Methods
Frequentist approach has general versatility; it can be used for parameter estimation with
one-sided and two-sided hypothesis testing or confidence interval estimation. However, the
method cannot reflect observation cost or prior information about an unknown parameter that
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we want to estimate. The hypothesis testing method can only answer whether we can determine
the hypotheses for the sample size and its obtained data; when a sample mean that is not in a
critical region is observed, we can make a decision with a reasonable probability of errors at most
α or β. In other words, the method does not give us any instruction if we get a sample mean
within the critical region.
Bayesian approaches with such minimum requirements as safety criteria are able to consider
prior information and update it with observed data. But these methods are even worse for the
two-action problem because they are proposed for two-sided hypothesis testing; thus, we cannot
simply apply the methods to the problem. Moreover, these models do not take into account
observation costs, so these Bayesian approaches are not suitable for the problem.
The VoI-based SSD method is the way to propose a proper sample size when we want to
consider observation costs and prior information about the unknown value. With a cost function,
which needs to be proposed additionally, we can derive the optimal sample size based on all the
information we have currently.
2.6 Engineering Standards and Guidelines for Sampling Size
Selection
For engineering purposes, various types of standards and guidelines for SSD have been provided.
Table 2.2 summarizes the approach taken by various standards and guidelines for SSD (American
Society for Testing and Materials, 2009, 2015, 2016; Electric Power Research Institute, 1999; U.S.
Department of Defence, 1957, 1989; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2006; U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, 1998, 2011). The first four standards are for components in a nuclear
power plant, and the other standards and guidelines are used for general components. All can
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Table 2.2: Summary of standards and guidelines for sample size determination
Code number Index Method Category
CSA N285.4 (2011) * Deterministic Operational experience
EPRI TR-017218-R1 (1999) Lot size Deterministic Operational experience
/Cube-root
U.S. NRC NUREG-1475 (2011) Percentage of defective Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
products / Mean value
U.S. NRC NUREG-1505 (1998) Mean value Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
MIL-STD-105D (1989) Percentage of defective Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
products
MIL-STD-414 (1957) Mean value Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
ASTM-E122 (2009) Mean value Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
ASTM-F302 (2015) Lot size Cube-root -
U.S. EPA QA/G-4 (2006) Mean value Hypothesis-testing Frequentist
be classified under three categories of methods: hypothesis-testing, deterministic, and cube-root.
Hypothesis-testing approaches are based on frequentist statistics and have been used for a long
time and in many fields. Deterministic methods rely on operational experiences. The rational
behind the suggested sample sizes is not clear. The cube-root method uses an equation; a sample
size is the cube-root value of the lot size of components. The theoretical background of this
method is not explained by the standards. No standard is based on the VoI concept.
2.6.1 Standards for Nuclear Power Plants in Canada
Guidelines of sampling inspection for nuclear power plants are summarized in CSA N285.4, whose
title is “Periodic inspection of CANDU nuclear power plant components” (National Standards
of Canada, 2014). It describes sampling at the beginning of use and at each periodic inspection
outage. For each component, required sample size and sampling rules are indicated. For example,
the minimum sample sizes for baseline (initial) inspection and each inspection interval are set
at 15 and 10, respectively. Requirements for other components are summarized in Table 2.3.
Although the guidelines have worked well at actual operating sites, no theoretical rationale exists
for the sample sizes and requirements for sample selection.
36
Table 2.3: Sample size requirements for a CANDU reactor
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Figure 2.5: Required sample size for each lot size
2.6.2 Standards for Nuclear Power Plants in the United States
Several documents show guidelines of sampling inspection for nuclear power plants in the United
States. EPRI TR-017218-R1, “Guideline for sampling in the commercial-grade item acceptance
process,” specifies a sampling plan and its sample size (Electric Power Research Institute, 1999).
For either non-destructive or destructive tests and inspections, sample size is determined by
choosing one of three plans, based on the importance of the inspection. The required sample
sizes are summarized in tables, for non-destructive or destructive testing. The sample sizes are
set referring to the acceptable quality level (limit) (AQL), and to the limiting quality (LQ), which
is sometimes called the rejectable quality level (RQL) or lot tolerance percent defective (LTPD),
but more-detailed explanations of each number are not included. Figure 2.5 shows how a required
sample size increases as the lot size becomes larger. Figure 2.6 depicts an example of how the
type I error changes as the lot size increases. Basic analysis of the sample size guideline reveals
inconsistencies in its underlying theory.
NUREG-1475 summarizes statistical theory and some methodologies that can be applied to
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Figure 2.6: Type I error for each lot size
regulating nuclear power plants (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011). Although this was
originally published as a guideline for licensing and regulating nuclear power plants, it is more
like a textbook of probability and statistics relating to the area. Both frequentist and Bayesian
statistics are described, but only the frequentist SSD approach is detailed. In cases of estimating
a mean or comparing two means, a required sample size is derived in a context of hypothesis
testing. The standard also derive a SSD approach for testing the percent defective, when the
defective occurrence is modelled by a hypergeometric distribution. A required sample size is
derived for an example through trial and error, with several combinations of sample sizes and
rejection regions of the null hypothesis.
NUREG-1505 is a textbook on using nonparametric statistics for final status decommissioning
surveys in nuclear power plants (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1998). This document
explains why and in which cases nonparametric statistics is more important than the parametric
statistics usually used with assumed normality of obtained data; then it introduces two
nonparametric hypothesis testing approaches: the Wilcoxon rank sum test and sign test. How to
derive a required sample size is explained for each.
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2.6.3 Standards for General Engineering Components in the United States
MIL-STD-105E is titled “Sampling procedures and tables for inspection by attributes” (U.S.
Department of Defence, 1989). The guideline was originally used by the military, but has since
been widely used in both military and civilian contexts to determine the AQL of products (Juran
et al., 1974). The term “quality” represents the percent of defective products or total number
of defects per 100 units; the latter can be more than 100 % according to the definition. The
process of sampling is modelled using a Bernoulli process, and the probability of acceptance for
each possible quality of a product is calculated by using Binomial or Poisson distribution. In
the model, AQL needs to be the same as or higher (worse) than the quality at which 95% of
products will be accepted. Figure 2.7 provides an example of the operating characteristic curve
(OCC), which shows the relationship between the probability of acceptance and the quality of
a product. AQL is defined as the quality at which the probability of acceptance is 95% in the
OCC. Similarly, the RQL is defined as an unacceptable quality, which is usually compared with
the quality with which the probability of acceptance is 10%; in other words, the probability of
rejection is 90%. In Figure 2.7, the AQL and RQL are 0.64 and 25.02, respectively. For each
combination of AQL and lot size, the required sample size and acceptance/rejection criteria are
summarized in the tables; however, the derivation process for the guideline is not fully or clearly
explained. As pointed out by Electric Power Research Institute (1999), the required sample sizes
increase intermittently; this characteristic may not be fully representative just before or after an
increase. This guideline has been adopted in several standards, such as ASTM-B602 (American
Society for Testing and Materials, 2016).
MIL-STD-414 specifies sampling plans when a measurement (as opposed to designations of
defective or not) is taken and recorded in the sampling procedure (U.S. Department of Defence,
1957). Although the approach is based on the one in MIL-STD-105D, this standard assumes
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Figure 2.7: Operating characteristic curve of a binomial distribution model with sample of size 8
that measurements follow a normal distribution, and an index calculated from the obtained
measurements is compared with a given acceptable value (Juran et al., 1974).
ASTM-E122 provides a required sample size that is based on a consistent statistical
background (American Society for Testing and Materials, 2009). The approach, classified as a
kind of frequentist approach, is mainly built for estimating a mean value for a certain component’s
parameter, but it can also be applied to a problem with percentages of defective components.
The idea is to find the minimum sample size with which the 3σ range of the sample is the same
or narrower than the range of acceptable error, E. Note that the 3σ range covers most probable
values of an unknown true mean; it reaches more than 99.7 % of all possible occurrences. The








where σ0 is an estimate of the lot or process standard deviation of a random variable X.
This has been written for the field sampling of aerospace fluids in containers (American Society
for Testing and Materials, 2015). This standard suggests the required sample size for the process,
which is calculated with cube-root method. The cube-root method is simply to derive an integer
of a cube-root number of a lot size; the results are summarized in Table 2.4. This method has
been cited and adapted in Electric Power Research Institute (1999).
Table 2.4: Sample plan introduced in ASTM-F302
Quantity of Containers Sample
1 to 10 1
11 to 30 3
31 to 70 4
71 to 150 5
151 to 210 6
211 to 530 8
531 to 1170 10
2.7 Gaps in the Research Literature
SSD methods vary, and they should be chosen based on their appropriateness for specific scenarios.
Currently, hypothesis-testing as a frequentist approach is used widely; however, the method
cannot reflect observation cost or prior information about an unknown parameter that we want
to estimate. An SSD method with VoI concept can overcome both weaknesses, so VoI-based
methods are appropriate for maintenance problems.
Stochastic degradation models have not applied to maintenance optimization analysis focusing
inspection decisions. Most studies assume random variable models or set transition probability
among limited numbers of conditions. The studies using VoI concept focus on measurement
errors and assume the random variable models. In these studies, decision makers focus on
42
accuracy of periodical inspection or sensor monitoring instead of deciding whether to inspect
and/or what sample size to inspect. On the other hand, the studies based on the partially
observable Markov decision process (POMDP) assume limited number of conditions, such as
no-damage, lightly-damaged, severely-damaged, and failure, and transition probabilities are set
for each possible condition-change.
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Chapter 3
Diagnostic Inspection of a
Component Population
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate a value of information (VoI)-based sample size
determination (SSD) approach for diagnostic inspections, with due consideration of the cost
consequences of decisions. The proposed approach is formulated within the context of engineering
components maintenance. An example is presented, and the parameter sensitivity is illustrated.
The proposed approach is compared with the hypothesis-testing approach as well to show the
advantages of value of VoI approach.
3.1 Problem Definition
Consider a population of N statistically identical components in an engineering system, which
could be vulnerable to some degradation process. A Decision Maker is interested in finding out the
extent of degradation in the population and replacing any defective components. Note that the
term “defective components” defines components that are going to fail before the next diagnostic
inspection. The cost of inspecting a component is CI . If components experience a degradation
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failure in service, it would result in a cost, CF , resulting from both interruption of the operation
and repair of the system. During an inspection, a component can be preventively replaced at a
cost, CP , such that CP < CF .
Because of large population size, the cost of full inspection, N CI , is so large that the decision
maker prefers not to commit to full inspection at the outset. The reason is that if degradation
affects a fairly small number of components, then full inspection would lead to considerable loss
of inspection resources (costs and time). A preferred approach is to demonstrate via sampling
that the extent of degradation small enough that full inspection is not warranted.
Thus, the decision maker decides to inspect a small sample, n, n < N , and use the information
obtained to make a decision to take one of the following two actions:
a1 : Inspect remaining population of, (N − n), and replace all defective components
(Full inspection)
a2 : Do not inspect remaining component population, and let components fail
in service incurring a cost, CF per failure (Do-nothing option)
A key objective is to find an optimal sample size, n, to support this decision problem.
3.1.1 Percentage of Defective Components
This section describes how to derive the percentage of defective components as the representative
random variable without explicit consideration of time in the model. Assume that the degradation
level at time t, Y (t), follows a random rate model:
Y (t) = Rt (3.1)
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where R is the random corrosion rate that reflects the variability observed in a sample of
deterioration data in a population of similar components. Consider the random variable, R,
which follows a probability density function of f(r) and has a cumulative function of F (r). A
component will fail before the next diagnostic inspection at t if it has a higher corrosion rate than
a threshold ρ, with which a component will fail at t. The probability of failure is calculated as
Pf = 1− F (ρ). (3.2)
This probability can also be interpreted as the percentage of defective components in the
population. When the function, F (r), is not obvious, the rate, Pf , needs to be treated as a
random variable, and can be denoted such as X. Thus, the percentage of defective components
can represent the variable nature of the deterioration in a population of similar components.
3.1.2 Cost Functions
The cost associated with the two actions depends on the percentage of degraded or defective
components, X, in the population. Unless the full inspection of N components is performed,
the defective fraction remains unknown to the decision maker, and so it is treated as a random
variable. The percentage of defective components can be the representative random variable of
this problem.
The two cost functions corresponding to the two actions for a certain value, X = x, are defined
as follows:
C(a, x | n,w) =
 C(a1, x | n,w)C(a2, x | n,w) =
 (N − n)CI + [(N − n)x+ w]CP(N − n)xCF + wCP , (3.3)
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Figure 3.1: Prior distribution for percentage of defective components.
where w is the number of detected defective components in the inspection sample of size n. Note
that these cost functions do not include the cost of sampling, nCI , as it is a deterministic cost.
In the Bayesian framework, a prior distribution can be assigned to X, which can be updated
as information become available. A discrete probability mass function is chosen to model X, as
shown in Figure 3.1, and defined below:
fX(xi) =
 0.05 forxi = i/100, i = 1, 2, · · · , 200 Otherwise. (3.4)
This distribution is chosen for illustration and it is also used later in the numerical example. The
mean and standard deviation of this distribution are 0.105 and 0.0577, respectively.
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Figure 3.2: Extended decision tree for a maintenance problem as a Bayesian pre-posterior
analysis.
3.2 Value of Information Analysis
The basis for formulating the VoI problem is the Bayesian pre-posterior analysis. The term
“Pre-posterior” is used to denote the consideration of a posterior situation, while the decision
maker is actually still in a prior situation. A component replacement problem is illustrated as
Figure 3.2. This analysis determines the options of n and a that minimize expected costs on
unknown values w and x.
3.2.1 Prior Analysis: No Inspection Data
In the absence of any inspection sample data, the decision maker should choose that action which
minimizes the expected cost. The prior cost function are defined as follows:
C(a, x) ≡
 C(a1, x | n = 0, w = 0)C(a2, x | n = 0, w = 0) =
 NCI +NxCPNxCF . (3.5)
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The variation of these costs with x is shown in Figure 3.3. In this two-action problem, there is a
break-even value, X = xb, for which the two costs are equal, and it is calculated as





In the VoI approach, the break-even value, xb, is a key parameter for decision-making. If x > xb,
the optimal action is a1, full-inspection. In case of x < xb, the optimal action is a2, “do-nothing”.
The expected prior cost for each terminal action is calculated as follows:
EX [C(a,X)] =
 EX [C(a1, X)]EX [C(a2, X)] =
 Nxb(CF − CP ) +Nx̄CPNx̄CF , (3.7)
where x̄ is the mean of X. For modifying equations to simpler form, we use CI = xb(CF − CP ),
which is originally derived in Equation (3.6). The optimal action should lead to a smaller cost
than the other option; thus, if a1 is optimal, the necessary condition is derived as
Nxb(CF − CP ) +Nx̄CP < Nx̄CF
⇔ x̄ > xb. (3.8)
If the mean value of the prior distribution is more than the break-even value, xb, the optimal




 Nxb(CF − CP ) +Nx̄CP if x̄ > xbNx̄CF if x̄ ≤ xb, (3.9)
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Figure 3.3: The prior cost functions for the two actions, as a function of defective fraction.
3.2.2 Posterior Analysis
After observing a sample, the decision maker derives a posterior distribution of X. Assuming
that the number of defective components, r, in a sample of n, follows a binomial distribution, its
mass function can be written as
fW (w | n) =
∑
x∈X






xwj (1− xj)n−w · fX(xj). (3.10)
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The posterior distribution for X is calculated using Bayes’ rule. For a value of w (0 ≤ w ≤ n)
and xk, the updated distribution is given as:
fX|W (xk | n,W ) =
fW |X(w | n, xk)fX(xk)









As an example, posterior distributions of X are computed for n = 6 and w = 0, 2, 4, 6, and
plotted in Figure 3.4. The expected posterior cost is calculated as
EX|W [C(a,X | n,w)] =
 EX|W [C(a1, X | n,w)]EX|W [C(a2, X | n,w)]
=
 (N − n)xb(CF − CP ) + (N − n)x̄
′′(n,w)CP + wCP
(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CF + wCP ,
(3.12)
where x̄′′(n,w) indicates a mean value of the probability mass function of x posterior to knowing
W = w and is a function of n and w. Note that the posterior distribution is still a discrete
distribution. Similar to Equation (3.8), when x̄′′(n,w) < xb, we take a1 as the optimal action;
otherwise, we take a2. For a given n, if we set hn, which satisfies x̄
′′(n, hn) < xb and x̄
′′(n, hn+1) >
xb simultaneously, we can calculate the minimum expected posterior cost so:
min
a
EX|W [C(a,X | n,w)]
=
 (N − n)xb(CF − CP ) + (N − n)x̄
′′(n,w)CP + wCP if w > hn
(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CF + wCP if w < hn.
(3.13)
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Figure 3.4: Posterior distributions of the percentage of defective components: An illustration for
w = 0, 2, 4, and 6.
3.2.3 Pre-posterior Analysis
The next step is the pre-posterior analysis, in which the decision maker considers all possible












(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CF + wCP
]





(N − n)xb(CF − CP ) + (N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CP + wCP
]
· fW (w | n) (3.14)
EVSI is a positive comparison between prior and posterior expected costs; this criterion
represents the value of sampling-inspection before the terminal decision. A more-detailed
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definition is as follows:
EVSI(n) ≡ EX [C(ao, X)]− EW
[













where EX|Z [g(X)] is an expectation of g(X) on X conditional on a given condition of Z = z;
fX|W (x | n,w) is a posterior probability density or mass function of a random variable, X,
conditional on n and w; ao is the optimal action without observation; and ao(w) is the optimal
action under a known sampling-inspection result, w. Since EVSI is an expected value prior to
additional observations, the second term is an expectation for both an uncertain event and the
as-yet-unknown observations.

















(N − n)fW (w | n)
]
xb(CF − CP )
−
∑hn








[(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)(CF − CP )] · fW (w | n) if x̄ ≤ xb.
(3.16)
EVSI is not a sufficient objective for SSD; the net gain through the observations should be
optimized. Subtracting the costs relating to a sampling-inspection, Cost(n,w), from EVSI, we
define another net benefit as the ENGS:
ENGS(n) = EVSI(n)− Cost(n,w) (3.17)
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This ENGS is a function of sample size n, and we estimate the optimal sample size that maximizes

























if x̄ ≤ xb.
(3.18)
Note that the details of analytical derivations for EVSI and ENGS are presented in the Appendix
A.
3.2.4 Numerical Example
To demonstrate the proposed VoI approach, the following parameter values are chosen: N = 100,
CF = 20, CP = 10, and CI = 1. The prior distribution of defective fraction, X, is shown in
Figure 3.1. The prior values of expected costs of the two actions, a1 (full inspection) and a2
(no inspection) are estimated as 205 and 210, respectively. Thus, a1, i.e., full inspection of the
component population followed by the preventive replacement of defective components found
during the inspection is the best prior action.
The next step is the pre-posterior analysis, which is illustrated for a sample size of n = 6.
Using the procedure described in the previous section, expected of best best action based on










Now, the EVSI and ENGS for n = 6 are computed as,
EVSI(n = 6) = EX|W [C(a1, X | n = 6, w)]− EW
[
EX|W [C(ao(w), X | n = 6, w)]
]
= 14.47,
ENGS(n = 6) = 8.47.
In this manner, the ENGS(n) is computed for n = 0 to n = 100 and plotted in Figure 3.5.
The optimal sample siz is n = 20 for which the ENGS takes a maximum value of 11.84. Note
that the small mounds in each line occur because the inspection outcome is discrete; once the
observed ratio, w/n, overlaps the break-even point, xb, the ENGS line starts to form another
small mound.
In a practical setting this result can be used in the following manner. The decision maker
inspects a random sample of 20 components. Depending on the number of defectives (r), the
following two actions are available:
• If w ≥ 2, i.e., w/n ≥ xb(= 0.1), then choose a1, which means full-inspection of the remaining
population of 80 components;
• If w ≤ 1, i.e., w/n ≤ xb(= 0.1), then choose a2, which no additional inspection required.
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
This Section evaluates the sensitivity of the optimal sample size to parameters like the break-even
value, xb, the prior mean, x̄
′, the inspection cost, CI , and the prior standard deviation, s(x)
′.
Let us set a base-line situation in which xb = 0.1, x̄
′ = 0.105, CI = 1, and s(x)
′ = 0.0577.
Each parameter is shifted from 80% to 120% of its base-line value; all other parameters are fixed.
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Figure 3.5: A plot of ENGS versus the sample size
Figure 3.6 illustrates the fluctuation of optimal sample sizes with changes in parameter values.
Note that the two cases, 80% for x̄′ and 120% for s(x)′, remain blank since a prior distribution
becomes improper in these cases; the distribution of x, which must be within the range between
0 and 1, has a positive probability mass for x < 0.
3.3.1 Break-Even Value, xb
The optimal sample size, no, for each xb is calculated and shown in Figure 3.7. The optimal
sample size tends to increase as xb decreases. When xb becomes smaller, the decision criterion,
hn, decreases since only small numbers of defective components can make the posterior mean,
x̄′′(n,w), be lower than xb. Thus, decision makers have more probability of observing w that is
higher than the decision criterion, hn, and consequently choosing a1 as a terminal action (see
Equation (3.13)). The higher the probability of choosing a1 as a terminal action after sampling
inspection, the more the incentive for decision makers to reduce the size of sampling inspection.
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Figure 3.6: Overall sensitivity analysis for parameters
An inverse movement for the optimal sample size exists around xb = 0.038. This exceptional
move occurs because of small mounds on the ENGS plots (see Figure 3.5). When xb < 0.038,
the peak is in the second mound, and the peak moves to the first mound when xb = 0.038. If
the criterion, xb, is greater than 0.136, the best behaviour for the decision maker is to take a2,
no-action, without any sample, which is a sampling inspection.
Figure 3.8 shows ENGS(no) for each xb. The peak of ENGS(n
o) value is obtained when xb
is the same as the prior mean, x̄′ = 0.105. Mathematically, this is dome because the derivative
of ENGS with respect to xb is positive when xb < x̄
′ and is negative when xb > x̄
′ (see Equation
(3.18)).
As xb is set close to x̄
′ but is lower than x̄′′, decision makers have more chance to obtain a
smaller x̄′′ than xb, which indicates that the terminal action should be different from the action
chosen based on prior analysis. In other words, in this case, the impact of additional information
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is relatively greater than it would be in other situations.
3.3.2 Mean of Prior Distribution, x̄′
With fixed values of CI , N , xb, and s(x)
′ at 1, 100, 0.10, and 0.0432, respectively, the influence
of the probability mean, x̄′, is analysed in Figures 3.9 and 3.10, which are closely related. The
results of sensitivity analysis on xb and x̄
′ are roughly symmetrical. Similar to the sensitivity
analysis on xb, the highest ENGS(n
o) is obtained when x̄′ equals the break-even value, xb = 0.10.
ENGSs decrease as x̄′ deviates from xb = 0.10. The gap between these two parameters represents
the importance of additional information, although this is not directly shown in Equation (3.18);
when the gap equals zero, the ENGS is maximized. If the optimal action is obvious only with
prior information, where a decision maker has a low probability of obtaining inspection outcomes
that suggest the decision maker change the terminal action, the decision maker need not obtain
any sample.
3.3.3 Inspection Cost, CI
As shown in Equation (3.18), the ENGS is proportional to CI , and the optimal sample sizes of all
cases are the same, no = 20. Thus, in this stated problem, we can normalize ENGS by dividing
it by CI or simply set CI as 1. Decision makers need to consider not the abstract values of CI ,
CF , and CP but a ratio between CI and (CF −CP ); xb is a key parameter in the stated problem.
3.3.4 Summary
Several insights have been found in this section. xb is the most sensitive parameter. Decision
makers need to identify relationships among CF , CP , and CI , which derive xb. The relationship
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Figure 3.7: Optimal sample sizes vs. xb
Figure 3.8: ENGS(no) vs. xb
Figure 3.9: Optimal sample size vs. x̄′
Figure 3.10: ENGS(no) vs. x̄′
between xb and x̄
′ sets the width of no values, in which the additional sampling is meaningful.
The more vague and difficult terminal decision-making with only prior information is, the more
ENGS(no) a decision maker obtains; in that situation, additional information has more value for
a decision maker. In other words, if the prior information is enough to decide an action to take,
a decision maker has no incentive to obtain any additional sample.
3.4 Hypothesis-Testing Approach
Classical hypothesis-testing, a frequentist approach, has primarily been used to estimate the
sample size required to test a statistical hypothesis regarding the magnitude of defective fraction,
X. In problems related to environmental risk assessment, the U.S. Environmental Protection
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Agency (2006) recommends the hypothesis-testing approach. Here, the sample size is selected to
ensure that statistical errors of Type I and II stay within certain reasonable limits.
There is a smaller range of X in which the two requirements are not satisfied, which called
a gray region. With the gray region’s maximum acceptable width as the third criteria, we can
determine the minimum sample size that satisfies the three restrictions.
3.4.1 Sample Size Analysis
The stated two-action problem can be translated as a hypothesis-testing problem. Respectively,
the null hypothesis and alternative hypothesis are
H0 : x = xb (or x ≥ xb), (then take a1, full-inspection)
H1 : x = x1 = xb − d (or x < xb), (then take a2, no-action),
where d is the gap between the two hypotheses, H0 and H1, and is defined as d = xb − x1. The
decision for the hypothesis-testing here is followed by an option; if we reject the null hypothesis,
the decision maker will take a2, “No-action.” If we fail to reject the null hypothesis, the decision
maker should take a1, “Full-inspection.” We can set a safety criteria, α, for the maximum
acceptable probability of rejecting H0 in error when H0 is true, which is called “type I error.”
It is assumed here that the normal distribution is an adequate approximation of the sampling
distribution of the defective fraction.
In the hypothesis-testing approach, a critical value (xcr), which is the cut-off value for type I
error, works as xb in the VoI-based approach, and is derived as








If the sampling inspection result, r/n, is lower than xcr, decision makers can reject H0 with a less
than α probability of type I error, and, consequently, they will take a2, no-action. Otherwise,
they should take a1, full inspection. Note that xcr is always lower than xb. Similarly, we can set
β as the maximum acceptable probability, erroneously not rejecting H0 when x = xb − d, which
means H1 is true (a type II error). In terms of the power of statistics, the requirement can be
explained as the required power of statistics, 1 − β, at x = xb − d. Here, d can be translated as
the width of a gray region; in it (xb − d ≤ x < xb), our decisions have a higher probability of
errors than β; decision makers have the probability of making type II errors (full-inspection when
x is safer, x < xb) more than β when they obtain the outcome of a sampling inspection that is
r/n > xcr while the true value, x, is in a gray region (xb − d ≤ x < xb). The relationship among
α, β, and d, is illustrated in Figure 3.11. For example, when α = 0.05, β = 0.2, and d = 0.04, the
cases with n = 20, n = 40, and n = 60 do not satisfy the requirements, whereas the other cases
do meet them. Details of how to decide on an action based on an obtained sample is explained by
Higo and Pandey (2016), although they use normal distribution instead of binomial distribution.
Through derivation processes explained by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2006),
assuming X follows the normal distribution with its mean and variance at x and x(1 − x)(N −








xb(1− xb) + z1−β
√
























(N − n)/(N − 1) is the finite population correction factor, which improves the accuracy
in the binomial approximation for a finite population (Sandiford, 1960).
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Figure 3.11: Illustration of three safety criteria and probability of error for each sample size
(α = 0.05, β = 0.2, and d = 0.04).
3.4.2 Numerical Example
The hypothesis-testing approach employs a widely used criteria, called the “20/80 rule”, which
implies that a sample estimate is within 20% of an unknown population parameter with 95%
confidence and 80% statistical power. We can use this rule with reference to the break-even
value, xb, of the defective fraction. To apply this rule, use α = 0.05, β = 0.20, d = 0.02, and
xb = 0.1 in Equation 3.20, which leads to a required sample size n ≥ 92.9. Thus, the minimum
sample size is 93.
The calculated sample size is a function of the width of the grey region, d, as shown in Table
3.1,where d is varied from 10 to 90 percent of the break-even value of xb = 0.10. As the gray
region becomes narrower, the required sample size increases and approaches the lot size, 100.
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Table 3.1: Minimum sample size for each d (for α = 0.05 and β = 0.20)
d d/xb(%) nmin xcr
0.09 90 30 0.024
0.08 80 38 0.036
0.07 70 46 0.046
0.06 60 55 0.055
0.05 50 65 0.064
0.04 40 76 0.072
0.03 30 85 0.079
0.02 20 93 0.086
0.01 10 99 0.093
3.5 Comparison
How to choose a sample size and an action at each decision node and react to any possible
inspection outcome can be summarized as a policy. The policy contains a selected sample size,
and a decision criterion, which is xb for the VoI approach and xcr for the hypothesis-testing
approach. The policies obtained through the two SSD approaches are compared in two scenarios
that are simulated based on x, which is either deterministic or stochastic. The deterministic
case highlights how a decision maker’s bias for x affects the consequences of different policies.
Through the comparison, effective situations for each method can be obtained and summarized.
The stochastic case provides an overall comparison of the two approaches. When the prior
distribution is reasonable, the expected total cost represents how much better one SSD method
is than the other.
3.5.1 Evaluation Scheme
In the deterministic case, the true proportion of the defective components, x, is assumed to be
a given fixed value. After an inspection policy is obtained through each approach “without”
63
knowing the exact value of x (with only the prior distribution), the policy is applied to the
scenario that is calculated “with” the given true value, x. The consequence of each policy is
evaluated as a total cost and the two policies are compared. For the VoI approach, given no, xb,
and x, the total cost is calculated as follows:
CV oI = n













C(a1, x | no, w)fW |X(w | x, no). (3.21)
Similarly, for the hypothesis-testing approach, given nmin, xcr, and x, the total cost is derived
as follows:
CHT = nminCI +
k∑
w=0




C(a1, x | nmin, w)fW |X(w | x, nmin), (3.22)
where k is the decision criterion, defined as k = bnmin · xcrc. Note that bxc is the floor function,
which returns the closest integer of less than x.
The stochastic case represents the situation where all information about x can be summarized
as a prior distribution (a probability mass function of x). In this case, given the probability of
occurrence for each possible x, the expected total cost is derived; for example, that for the VoI
approach is
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C(a1, x | no, w)fW |X(w | x, no)fX(x). (3.23)
3.5.2 Certain x Case
For each possible x, the costs for each approach are calculated and summarized in Figure 3.12.
The VoI approach reduces the cost if x is less than xb, which is set at 0.10. However, once x
becomes larger than xb, the VoI approach raises the cost, since the decision can be wrong if the
sample of a sampling-inspection does not represent the group. This result indicates that if the
decision maker sets a prior distribution conservatively, the VoI approach can provide a lower
total cost. For instance, if the true percentage of defective components is 0.01, and we set a prior
distribution with its mean at 0.105, the difference between the cost with VoI approach is less than
the cost with the hypothesis-testing approach with the d = 0.02 case by more than 18 times CI .
3.5.3 Uncertain x Case
With the prior distribution shown in Figure 3.1 as an example of reasonable estimation for the
occurrence of each X = x, the expected costs for each approach are compared (Table 3.2). The
results indicate that the VoI approach is best when the prior distribution is proper. For example,
if we take the “20/80 rule,” the expected cost with the rule is higher than that with the VoI
approach by 10.4 times CI .
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Figure 3.12: Total costs for each approach for x = 0.01 to x = 0.20.
Table 3.2: Expected total cost for each approach.
Approach Expected total cost Sample size
Hypothesis-testing d=0.02 203.6 93
approach d=0.04 200.4 76
d=0.06 197.1 55
d=0.08 196.6 38
VoI-based approach 193.2 20
Qualitative Comparison
The VoI approach is more suitable for the stated problem than the hypothesis-testing approach,
and the limitations of the hypothesis-testing approach are apparent. When we consider fewer
failure cases such as x = 0.01, we cannot set a reasonable gray region. In addition, when x is too
small, approximation using normal distribution for binomial distribution is inappropriate.
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3.6 Summary
Diagnostic inspections are carried out to evaluate the condition of a large population of
(statistically) similar components found in an engineering system like a power plant or processing
unit. There are two possible actions for the engineer. Either inspect every component and
replace potentially defective components, or take no action and deal with component failures
as they occur. The problem can be formulated as a statistical decision problem in which the
information collected by the inspection of a relatively small sample can play a key role.
This chapter presents a systematic VoI approach to determine the optimal sample size as a
function of consequential costs associated with the two actions. The comparison between the
VoI-based and a traditional approach shows that the VoI approach is preferable to the traditional
approach of statistical hypothesis-testing.
The major insights found for diagnostic inspection problems are summarized as follows:
• The more vague and difficult terminal decision-making with only prior information is, the
more ENGS(no) a decision maker obtains; in that situation, additional information has
more value for a decision maker;
• The most sensitive parameter in the diagnostic inspection problem is the break-even value,
xb, which represents the balance of costs: inspection, replacement, and failure costs;
• The highest VoI is expected when the break-even value, xb, and the mean of prior
distribution, x̄′, are the same, in which case, the decision maker has the highest risk of
taking an inappropriate action based only on prior information;
• The VoI approach is economically more effective unless prior information is irrelevant;




Inspection Problem with the
Random Rate Degradation Model
In this chapter, the value of information (VoI)-based sample size determination (SSD) method
is modelled with one of the simplest and the most typical random variable models: the random
rate model. This model, which assume a linear degradation process, is first introduced, and
then mathematically formulated in the context of a sequential decision-making problem. A
numerical example is demonstrated, and insights about using SSD with random variable models
are discussed.
4.1 Problem Definition
Consider a population of N statistically identical components in an engineering system, which
could be vulnerable to some degradation process and fail if not replaced in time. The system is
known to be decommissioned at t2, and operators intend to inspect each component with cost of
CI and replace them if needed at an earlier time t1 < t2. A component would break and result
in a cost, CF , if its level of degradation reaches the safety limit, ρF . Broken components will
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be replaced immediately after failure. During an inspection, a component can be preventively
replaced at a cost, CP , such that CP < CF .
For better estimation of the parameter and prediction of the components’ states, X(t2),
inspection will be held at t1 on selected components. Thus, the problem can be defined as a
two-stage decision-making problem. At the first stage, size of sampling inspection is determined,
and at the second stage, based on the inspection outcome of X(t1), operators will decide whether
to replace individual components, either the inspected or other, un-inspected components. Note
that we assume inspection and replacement actions take no time, and these two stages are in t1.
What operators have to do first is to determine which components will be inspected. For simpler
notation, we use X1 and X2 instead of X(t1) and X(t2), respectively.
The major concern of the operators are the risk of a component breaking between t1 and
t2, P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ]. Although the sampling inspection at t1 costs CI , it also reduces
uncertainty in P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ], and consequently, reduces the probabilities of taking an
improper action such as replacing safe components.
The assumptions we set in this stated problem are summarized as follows:
• Degradation of components follows a random rate model;
• Components are statistically independent of one another;
• The probability of a replaced component failing before t2 is negligible;
• Every component survives until t1 (x1 < ρF ).
When the nominal life of a component, t1, is longer than the remaining system life, t2 − t1, the
third assumption is reasonable. The fourth assumption is set to avoid unnecessary calculations
in the analysis. The cost arising before t1 cannot be reduced and is the same for any consequence
because operators no option prior to t1.
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4.1.1 Two-Stage Decision-Making Problem
Operators have to decide whether to inspect a component and whether to replace it. At t1,
this problem can be formulated as a sequential decision involves two decisions: inspection
and replacement. Figure 4.1 illustrates the two-stage decision-making for a single component
inspection problem. At the inspection stage, the operators’ options are
e(t1) =
 e1 : Inspecte2 : Not inspect. (4.1)
The two actions at the replacement stage for each component are defined as
a(t1) =
 a1 : Replacea2 : Do not replace. (4.2)
The probability of a component breaking between t1 and t2, P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ], will also
be evaluated, based on its estimated state for time t2. Note that Xi represents a component’s
condition at ti. Although the sampling inspection at t1 costs CI , it also reduces uncertainty in
P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ], and consequently, reduces the probabilities of taking an improper action
such as replacing safe components.
4.2 Value of Information Analysis
The VoI approach based on random rate model is derived in this section. Because of the
assumption for the degradation model, a future condition is precisely predictable once the
component is inspected.
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Figure 4.1: Extended decision tree for a single-component inspection problem
4.2.1 Random Rate Model
A random rate model is the simplest case of the random variable model, which is widely used for
maintenance decision problems (e.g., Pandey (1998); Stewart and Rosowsky (1998); Hong (2000);
Pandey et al. (2009)). Under the model, once the corrosion rate for a component is observed, its
future degradation level is precisely predictable. Thus, whether the inspected component will fail
before the next diagnostic inspection is obvious. In the random rate model, the deterioration is
assumed to linearly proceed over time with a random degradation rate R. The degradation level
is formulated as
X(t) = Rt. (4.3)
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The degradation has always non-negative increments; R is assumed to follow a gamma distribution
with the probability density function expressed as follows:
fR(r | µ) = ga(r; 1/ν2, 1/µν2). (4.4)
Note that, with the random rate model, X(t2) of a component can be estimated without any
uncertainties once R for the component is revealed through observation of X(t1).
All components can be categorized to two conditions: r < rF2 and rF2 ≤ r < rF1. Note
that the condition of rF1 ≤ r is excluded from the analysis because of the assumption that the
components survive at t1. The two thresholds, rF1 or rF2 is the degradation rate that reaches
ρF at t1 or t2, respectively. In maintenance decision, rF2 becomes a key decision criterion about





4.2.2 Probability Density Functions of Random Variables
The operators’ knowledge about µ is summarized as its prior distribution. For simplicity, we take
an inverse-gamma distribution as it is a conjugate distribution for a gamma distribution.















Figure 4.2: Two decision thresholds, rF1 and rF2, in the random rate model
where α and β are coefficients selected based on prior information. With inspection outcomes of
n components at t1, the posterior distribution of M becomes










Note that the posterior distribution is still inverse-gamma distribution, which is the conjugate
distribution for the gamma distribution. With the posterior distribution, we can calculate the
expected costs of un-inspected components.
For convenience, Equation (4.4) is rewritten as
fR(r | µ) = ga(r; 1/ν2, 1/µν2). (4.8)
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Based on the equation, the probability density function of x1 is derived as








Because of the additivity nature of a gamma distribution, the probability density function of Sn
becomes
fSn(sn | µ) = ga(sn;n/ν2, 1/µt1ν2). (4.10)




fSn(sn | µ)fM (µ)dµ. (4.11)




fR(r | µ)fM (µ)dµ. (4.12)
4.2.3 Prior Analysis
Operators, based on the prior distribution, have to assign an expected cost for evaluating and
estimating the risk between t1 and t2 as follows:
EM [C(a,M)] =
 CP if a = a1CFEM [P [R ≥ rF2 | R < rF1]] if a = a2. (4.13)
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Note that P [R ≥ rF2 | R < rF1] is calculated as




where FR(r) denotes the cumulative density function of fR(r | µ). Comparing the two expected
costs for the two actions, operators will take the one that leads to lower cost. The expected
optimal cost without inspection is calculated thus:
Coprior = mina
EM [C(a,M)]
= min (CP , CFEM [P [R ≥ rF2 | R < rF1]]) . (4.15)
That selected minimum expected cost is the baseline for evaluating how much a sampling
inspection contributes to the effectiveness of an operators’ decision.
4.2.4 Inspected Components
Since the random rate model is a deterministic process, whether the component fails depends on
whether the observation, r, is greater than rF2. Thus, operators do not have to use the posterior
distribution of µ and calculate the expected posterior costs. Conditional on the situation of r,
the posterior costs with optimal action become
C(ao,M | x1 ≥ rF2t1) = CI + min (CP , CF )
= CI + CP , (4.16)
C(ao,M | x1 < rF2t1) = CI + min (CP , 0)
= CI . (4.17)
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Note that operators can always avoid failure of the inspected component because that the
inspection outcome add certainty on the operators’ decision, hence the analysis for inspected
components excludes the cost of failure, CF , in the formula. Operators will take an action that




 CI + CP if r ≥ rF2CI if r < rF2 . (4.18)










= CI + CP
∫∞
0 [FR(rF1)− FR(rF2)]fM (µ)dµ∫∞
0 FR(rF1)fM (µ)dµ
(4.19)
For the VoI analysis for a single-component problem, the ENGS is calculated as the gap








Note that this ENGS represents the net benefit of the perfect information about the future




For a multiple-component problem, the influence of the parameter uncertainty on un-inspected
components need to be identified. Although an un-inspected component has no obtaining
information for its own, operators can improve the estimation of its condition at t2 through
reducing parameter uncertainty. With the posterior distribution in Equation (6.20), the expected
cost for an un-inspected component is derived as
Cnon(a) = EM |sn [C(a,M | e2, n, sn)]
=
 CP if a = a1CFEM |sn [P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ]] if a = a2, (4.21)
Similar to Equation (3.8), we define the break-even value for the sum of the observation, snb, as
it satisfies the following equation:









 CP if sn > snbCFEM |sn [P [R ≥ rF2 | R < rF1]] if sn ≤ snb . (4.23)
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Thus, the expected pre-posterior cost for an un-inspected component is calculated as follows:











fM (µ | sn)fSn(sn)dµdsn. (4.24)
4.2.6 Optimal Decision for Inspection
The ENGS is defined as the difference between prior and pre-posterior expected costs, represented
respectively, as
Cprior(n) = N min
a





+ (N − n)ESn [Conon] . (4.26)
We can obtain the ENGS(n) thus:
ENGS(n) = Cprior − Cprepost (4.27)
Then, we can derive the optimal sample size, no, with which operators will obtain the highest
ENGS, as follows:




The initial settings are imposed as N = 100, CF = 100, CP = 10, CI = 1, t1 = 25, t2 = 30,
1/ν2 = 9, and ρF = 3.0. The prior distribution for µ is given as Iga (µ; 540, 47.16), derived from
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observed data. The mean and the coefficient of variance (COV) are 0.087 and 0.043, respectively.
4.3.1 Single-Component Problem
The optimal action of the prior analysis is “replace,” with its expected cost of 10. The
pre-posterior cost is derived as 2.94. The optimal decision is to replace the component if the
observed degradation rate, r, is greater than the decision-criterion, rF2 = 0.1. Then, the ENGS,
which is the gap between the two costs, is 7.04.
The impacts of the replacement and failure costs are is analysed. Figure 4.3 shows the ENGS
for each possible combination of CF and CP . It indicates that the ENGS is proportional to
CP /CF ; as CF increases or CP decreases, operators are expected to obtain higher ENGS. The
ENGS has its peak when CP /CF is around 20% and drops off as CP /CF becomes smaller than
that peak value. Since P [R ≥ rF2 | R < rF1] with the initial settings is 0.196, when CP /CF is
around the value, operators cannot make their decision with confidence relying only on their
current information.
4.3.2 Multiple-Component Problem
The ENGS for each possible sample size is numerically obtained for a multiple-component
inspection problem with a random rate model. We use the same initial settings. Without
inspection, the optimal action for the prior analysis is a2, “do-not-replace.” The ENGS is derived
as shown in Figure 4.4. The optimal sample size is 100. For any sample size, most of the
ENGS is obtained from inspected-components. The percentage of the benefit from un-inspected
components is at most 5 % of the ENGS. Thus, the optimal sample size is determined based on
the balance between inspection and replacement costs, CI and CP , respectively.
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Figure 4.3: ENGS for each possible combination of CF and CP for a single-component problem
with a random rate model (CI = 1)
Figure 4.4: ENGS and its origin at each sample size (CI = 1, CP = 10, and CF = 100)
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4.4 Summary
This chapter has presented a VoI-based SSD method for maintenance problems with the random
rate degradation model. The procedure is mathematically formulated in the structure of a
two-stage decision-making problem. The formulated mathematical method is applied to a
numerical example.
Numerical example illustrated several findings for SSD strategies as follows:
• The benefit obtained by reducing parameter uncertainty is limited;
• No optimal sample size is found (zero or the population size is suggested);
• Because of the nature of the random rate model, an inspection outcome provides perfect
information about the future state of the inspected component.
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Chapter 5
Inspection Problem with the Gamma
Process Degradation Model:
Without Parameter Uncertainty
This chapter provides a simple but flexible mathematical sample size determination (SSD)
model for a multiple-component system undergoing a realistic degradation process, the gamma
process model. The proposed model illustrates how reducing temporal uncertainty contributes
to benefiting from inspections even without epistemic uncertainties. The model provides the
basis of value of information (VoI)-based SSD approach on condition-based maintenance. Under
an assumption of statistical independence among component degradation levels, the model
is applied to a practical case study and demonstrates how the ENGS is evaluated for both
previously inspected and un-inspected components. The evaluation indicates prioritization rule
for components for which previous inspection data is available.
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5.1 Problem Definition
The same problem introduced in Chapter 4 is adopted except the degradation model. The gamma
process model is applied to the VoI-based SSD method instead of the random rate model. In this
chapter, no parameter uncertainty is included in the analysis; the components are statistically
independent. The assumptions we set in this stated problem are:
• Degradation of components follows the gamma process model;
• Components are statistically independent of one another;
• The probability of a replaced component failing before t2 is negligible;
• Every component survives until t1 (x1 < ρF ).
When the nominal life of a component, t1, is longer than the remaining system life, t2 − t1, the
third assumption is reasonable.
5.1.1 Two-Stage Decision-Making Problem
The two-stage decision-making for a single-component inspection problem introduced in Chapter
4 is used (see Figure 4.1). The degradation of components is assumed to follow a stochastic
degradation model, the gamma process. Operators have prior information about a parameter of
the process; however, it is desired to update it after new data become available from inspection.
At the inspection-decision stage, the operators take one of the following two inspection options:
e(t1) =
 e1 : Inspecte2 : Not inspect. (5.1)
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Consequently, for each component at t1, the operators make a decision between the following two
actions:
a(t1) =
 a1 : Replacea2 : Do not replace. (5.2)
5.1.2 Gamma Process Model
Let us set a random variable, X(t), as a degradation level. If the random variable follows a
gamma process, it has properties as follows:
• X(0) = 0 with probability one;




) for any t ≥ 0 and ∆t ≥ 0; and
• For any choices of n ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ t0 < t1 < · · · < tn < ∞, the random variables
X(t0), X(t1)−X(t0), · · · , X(tn)−X(tn−1) are independent,
where ga(∆x; a, b) represents a gamma probability density function with coefficients of a and b;
µ and ν are the mean and coefficient of variance of deterioration in a unit time, respectively. The




















f∆X(∆x | µ)d∆x. (5.4)
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5.2 Value of Information Analysis
This section examines the independent component inspection problem, which helps us to
understand the nature of the two-stage decision-making process. The expected net gain of
sampling (ENGS) is calculated and evaluated.
5.2.1 Random Variables
The vector of random variables, Z1 = (X1, X2), is the source of uncertainties. The ENGS
is obtained by reducing these uncertainties through observing Z1. X2 is dependent on the
deterioration level at t1 (X1) as X2 = X1 + ∆X. Under the assumption of x1 < ρF , the





fX2|X1(x2 | x1) = g(x2 − x1), (5.6)
The joint distribution of X1 and X2 is
fX1,X2(x1, x2) = fX2|x1(x2 | x1)fX1(x1)
=






































FX2|x1(x2 | x1)(ρ) =
∫ ρ
x1




5.2.2 Structure of Problem
Each possible consequence is evaluated based on its total cost, including any inspection, preventive
replacement, and corrective replacement costs. The total cost is function of a replacement action,
A, and random variables, Z1. Thus, although operators cannot directly observe X2, they can




CP if a = a1
CF if a = a2 and X2 = x2 ≥ ρF
0 if a = a2 and X2 = x2 < ρF .
(5.10)
To make the problem even simpler, let us consider the expected costs in t1 and t2. We get the
costs as
C(a) = EZ1 [C(a,Z1)]
=
 CP if a = a1CFP [X2 ≥ ρF ] if a = a2 . (5.11)
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Note that P [X2 ≥ ρF ] is calculated as




[1− F∆X(ρF − x1)]fX1(x1)dx1, (5.12)
where F∆X(ρF − x1), which is a cumulative probability density, denotes the probability that the
increments is less than ρF − x1 so that the component will not fail.
5.2.3 Problem Classification
The stated maintenance problem is classified as decision-making under imperfect information.
Although perfect information of X1 is available, uncertainty still remains on X2 and consequently
on Z1. Thus, since perfect information can be considered as a special case of imperfect information
case, we define the EVSI and ENGS for the problem. However, further discussion of its
classification helps to understand the characteristics of the problem. Because of the perfect
information assumption on X1, the problem can be classified as a special case of the expected
value of partial perfect information (EVPPI). The EVPPI is an expected value under perfect
information on a subset of random variables. If dependence exists between the random variable
in the subset and other random variables that have no direct observations, calculation of EVPPI
becomes computationally expensive (Claxton and Sculpher, 2006; Jalal et al., 2015). Since X2
is dependent on X1, the original assumption breaks and this stated problem can be considered
as the EVPPI with dependence between random variables with and without perfect information.
Chapter 5 defines the problem that is classified as the EVPPI with dependent random variables
but not requires complicated computational calculation, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.2.4 Prior Analysis
For the prior analysis, we focus on the replacement stage with the given inspection action,
“not-inspect (e2).” Comparing the two expected costs for the two actions in Equation (5.11),




C(a) = min(CP , CFP [X2 > ρF ])
= min(CP , CF (1− FX2(ρF ))) (5.13)
That selected minimum expected cost is the baseline for evaluating how much a sampling
inspection contributes to the effectiveness of a operators’ decision.
5.2.5 Posterior Analysis
For the posterior and pre-posterior analyses, we consider the case with the given inspection
action, “inspect (e1).” At time t1, the inspection is done and the actual state of the deterioration
is revealed. Suppose X1 = x1 < ρF . The expected maintenance cost of an inspected component,
which is different from the one without inspection, is
C(a | x1) = EZ1|x1 [C(a,Z1 | x1)]
=
 CI + CP if a = a1CI + CF [1− F∆X(ρF − x1)] if a = a2 . (5.14)
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where [1− F∆X(ρF − x1)] is the probability of failure at t2. The probability is calculated
1− F∆X(ρF − x1) = P [∆X > ρF − x1]
= P [X1 + ∆X ≥ ρF | X1 = x1] . (5.15)
Since operators will take the action of lower expected cost, the minimum expected cost is
min
a
C(a | x1) = CI + min
a
{CP , CF [1− F∆X(ρF − x1)]} (5.16)
5.2.6 Pre-posterior Analysis
Remember that operators have not actually obtained the inspection outcome at the time of
inspection planning, as it is only available after the inspection is undertaken. We thus have to
consider all possible outcomes of the inspection, which follows a gamma distribution. With this,







= CI + min
a
{CP ,EX1 [CF [1− F∆X(ρF − x1)]]} . (5.17)
5.2.7 Optimal Decision for Inspection
As defined in Section 2, the ENGS is the difference between the two expected optimal costs shown










When the value is positive, operators should inspect a component at t1 and consequently choose
a1 if x1 > x1b or a2 if x1 ≤ x1b. When it is negative, they should take an action based only on
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prior information.
5.3 Problem with Previous Inspection Data
The proposed approach can be extended for a case in which data from previous components is
available. Let us assume that, in the past, operators inspected a component at t0 and obtained
its condition, x0. Let us set ∆t01 as t1 − t0, and X(∆t01) be the degradation increment within
∆t01. Once we replace ρF , X1, and x1 with ρF − x0, x0 + X(∆t01), and x0 + x01, respectively,
in the equations derived in Section 5.2, we can apply the approach to the case with previous
inspection data.
5.3.1 Prior Analysis
In this case, Equation (5.13) is modified as follows:
min
a
C(a | x0) = min(CP , CFP [X2 ≥ ρF | X(∆t01) < ρF − x0]) (5.19)
where P [X2 ≥ ρF | X(∆t01) < ρF − x0] is a probability of failure by t2 given x0, with an
assumption that the component will not fail until t1. This probability is calculated as








where fX(∆t01)(x01) is the probability density function of the degradation progress within ∆t01.
That selected minimum expected cost is the baseline for evaluating how much a sampling
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inspection contributes to the effectiveness of an operators’ decision.
5.3.2 Pre-posterior Analysis





C(a | e1, x0, x01)
]







P [X2 ≥ ρF | X(∆t01) < ρF − x0] fX(∆t01)(x01)dx01. (5.21)
5.3.3 Optimal decision for inspection
The object of the decision-making problem is to determine the best inspection action at t1. By
calculating a gap between the two expected optimal costs shown in Equations (5.19) and (5.21),
we can derive the ENGS, for the problem with previous inspection data:
ENGS = min
a




C(a | e1, x0, x01)
]
. (5.22)
When the value is positive, operators should inspect a component at t1 and consequently choose
a1 if x1 = x0 + x01 > x1b or a2 if x1 = x0 + x01 ≤ x1b. When it is negative, they should take an
action based only on prior information.
5.4 Practical Example – Nuclear Piping Systems
Feeder pipes comprise an important part of the primary heat transport system of a CANDU
reactor. They connect to a fuel channel and convey coolant from and to pressure tubes
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(Figure 1.1). Wall thinning of the outlet feeders, where flow-accelerated corrosion (FAC) is
the degradation mechanism, is a major concern of operators as it may cause heavy water leakage
when it exceeds the allowable limit. Due to FAC, fatal accidents have occurred in two nuclear
plants: the Surry PWR in the US in 1986 and the Mihama 3 PWR in Japan in 2004.
FAC is a process whereby the protective magnetite layer on carbon steel dissolves due to
the flowing coolant (water or wet steam) (Dooley and Chexal, 2000). Since the corrosion rate
is controlled by the diffusion of iron through the oxide film, the thickness of which reaches a
steady-state, the FAC tends to progress at a constant rate (Garland, 2014). The degradation
process can be reliably assumed to follow a gamma process model (Yuan, 2007). To plan and
conduct well-organized preventive maintenance of the feeder pipes, operators need to implement
inspections, which are very expensive because of the high radiation dose.
The objective of the case study is to evaluate the net gain on sampling (ENGS) for each
component and to identify which components should be inspected in an inspection outage at t1.
We demonstrate the VoI-based approach using this case study. In the case study, the procedure
theoretically developed in this chapter is illustrated with real numbers.
5.4.1 Data
At a site, 61 of 380 components were previously inspected: 50 feeder pipes with two measurements,
and 11 pipes with three consecutive measurements. The measured minimum thickness of the
fourteen-probe ultrasonic testing bracelet has been stored for each pipe at each inspection outage
time. The measurement locations are approximately the same between the outages. The initial
wall thickness is estimated at 5.3 mm. The data on the inspected degradation level is illustrated
in Figure 5.1. Based on the data, the parameters of the gamma process, µ and ν, are estimated
through the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE); the parameters are estimated at (µ, ν) =
92
Figure 5.1: Inspected data of 50 feeder pipes with two measurements and 11 pipes with three
consecutive measurements
(0.0836, 0.584). We impose several initial settings: CF = 100, CP = 10, CI = 1, t1 = 25, t2 = 30,
and ρF = 3.0.
5.4.2 Single-Component without Previous Inspection
As a first step of a demonstration, we show the VoI-based analysis for a single-component
inspection problem step by step. Since the probability of failure between t1 and t2 is P [X2 ≥ ρF ] =
0.0391, operators can obtain the prior expected cost introduced in Equation (5.13), as
C(a) =
 10.0 if a = a13.91 if a = a2
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Comparing the two expected costs for the two actions, without inspection, operators will take a2,
“do not replace,” with its expected cost 3.91.
For better understanding of pre-posterior analysis, let us consider a fictitious situation where
we obtain X1 = 2.50. Based on Equation (5.14), the cost function of an inspected component is
C(a | x1) =
 11.0 if a = a123.1 if a = a2
The minimum expected cost is minaC(a | x1) = 11.0, and the optimal action given X1 = 2.50 is
a1, “replacement.” Note that the break-even value of x1, x1b, is 2.38.
Remember that operators have not actually obtained any sampling inspection outcome. We
thus have to consider all possible outcomes and their probability of occurrence. The expected








The object of the decision-making problem is to determine the best (most cost effective)
inspection at t1. By calculating a gap between the two expected optimal costs formulated in
Equation (6.17), we can derive ENGS:
ENGS = 3.91− 2.35
= 1.56.
Since the value is positive, operators should inspect a component at t1 and consequently choose
a1 if x1 > 2.38 or a2 if x1 ≤ 2.38.
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Table 5.1: Number of components for each inspection decision
Inspection decision Do not inspect Inspect
Previously inspected components 46 15
Components without inspection 0 319
5.4.3 Value of Inspection with Previous Observation Data
For each component, we derive ENGS, decide if the component should be inspected or
reinspected, and summarize the results in Table 5.1. This analysis shows that 334 components
have a positive ENGS, meaning they should be inspected. Note that 15 are previously inspected
components, and all the previously un-inspected components have positive ENGS. Only five
components have higher ENGS values than the components that have never been inspected
before. This result indicates that inspecting components inspected previously tends to be less of
a priority than is examining un-inspected components.
The optimal plan is to inspect 334 out of 380 components; the accumulated ENGS is 512,
which is the total contribution of the inspection at t1. Figure 5.2 illustrates the relation among
x0, t0, and ENGS for each component. The components for which operators have a low risk to
make an incorrect decision have a negative ENGS, and the components where the risk is high
have positive ENGS.
5.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a VoI-based SSD method for maintenance problems, one that
considers temporal uncertainty in the model. First, we introduced the method with the baseline
mathematical model and showed the general characteristics of the stated problem. The model was
extended to the case of previous inspection data. We have demonstrated the proposed method
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Figure 5.2: ENGS for each component with previous inspection data
through a realistic numerical example. The results provide operators with not only the sample
size but also the priority of inspection, which is useful if a large sample size is not feasible because
of other restrictions such as resources.
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Chapter 6
Inspection Problem with Gamma
Process Degradation Model: With
Parameter Uncertainty
This chapter extends the sample size determination (SSD) model proposed in Chapter 5 for
a maintenance and inspection for multiple-components that are dependent each other through
the shared parameter uncertainty. Because of the dependency, operators need to take all the
conditions of all inspected components in their consideration so that the SSD model used in
Chapter 5 cannot be applied to the multiple-component system. The additivity characteristics
of the gamma distribution mean that only the sum of the observation outcomes needs to be
considered – as a representative variable – instead of considering the conditions of each component
separately. This simplification is critical for the updating process in pre-posterior analysis.
Moreover, the impacts of epistemic (parameter) and aleatory (temporal) uncertainties are
explicitly compared. These uncertainties have not been comprehensively analysed; the traditional
value of information (VoI) concept considers only parameter uncertainties, and the studies with
partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) mainly focus on measurement errors. The
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VoI-based approach with a time-dependent degradation process is modelled and quantitatively
analysed with both uncertainties included.
6.1 Problem Definition
The same problem used in Chapter 5, which is originally introduced in Chapter 4, is adopted
except that the degradation model includes parameter uncertainty in it. Because of the parameter
uncertainty, the degradations of components are independent only if the parameters of the
degradation model are given. Thus, the degradations are conditional independent with the
parameter uncertainty. The assumptions we set in this stated problem are summarized as follows:
• Degradation of components follows the gamma process model;
• Components are statistically independent of one another given parameters of the
degradation model;
• The probability of a replaced component failing before t2 is negligible;
• Every component survives until t1 (x1 < ρF ).
When the nominal life of a component, t1, is longer than the remaining system life, t2 − t1, the
third assumption is reasonable.
6.2 Single-Component Problem
This chapter builds the model with both temporal (aleatory) and parameter (epistemic)
uncertainties. Based on the problem with only temporal uncertainty defined in Chapter 5,
the single-component problem is first stated for illustrative reason, and the full model is next
introduced.
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6.2.1 Prior and Posterior Distribution
The prior distribution of M is assumed to follow an inverse-gamma distribution as it is a conjugate
distribution for a gamma distribution.














where α and β are coefficients selected based on prior information, which can be previous data
or experts’ knowledge.
Once inspection outcome is obtained as X1 = x1, through a Bayesian updating procedure, a
posterior distribution of M is obtained:











The vector of the random variables, Z2 = (M,X1, X2), is the source of uncertainties. The ENGS
is obtained by reducing these uncertainties through observing Z2. Under the assumption of
x1 < ρF , the conditions at t1 and t2 are estimated based on the probability density functions
(PDFs) of X1 and X2, respectively, as follows:




fX2|M,X1(x2 | µ, x1) = g(x2 − x1), (6.4)
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The increment of the degradation level between t1 and t2, ∆x, has the following PDF:
f∆X|M,X1(∆x | µ, x1) = g(∆x) (6.5)
The joint distribution of M and X1 is



























































Note that the cumulative density function of X1 is difficult to calculate the general form. To
evaluate the integrations, the sample from the marginal distribution is created from the joint
distribution, fM,X1(µ, x1), using Gibbs sampling. See Section 6.4.1 for more detail. Another
approximation method for calculating the integrations is introduced in Section 6.4.3.
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For the posterior analysis, the joint distribution of M and X2 given X1 = x1 is
fM,X2|X1(µ, x2 | x1)































The marginal distribution of X2 given X1 = x1 is
fX2|X1(x2 | x1) =
∫ ∞
0































































Note that FX2|X1(ρ) is the same as F∆X(ρF − x1), which is the CDF of ∆x.
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6.2.3 Prior Analysis
First, as a prior analysis, operators need to know the best possible decisions when no
sampling-inspection data is available. The total cost is dependent on an action, A, and random
variables, Z2 = (M,X1, X2). Operators, based only on the prior distribution of M , evaluate each
action by estimating the risk between t1 and t2. Equation (5.11) is modified as follows:
EZ2 [C(a,Z2)] =
 CP if a = a1CFEM [P [X2 > ρF ]] if a = a2, (6.13)
Note that, for convenience, x(ti) for i = 1, 2 is shortened to xi. According to the assumption,
although operators do not know what X1 is, we assume that all possible values as a x1 satisfies
0 < x1 < ρF .
Comparing the two expected costs for the two actions, operators will take the one that leads
to lower cost. The expected optimal cost without inspection is calculated thus:
min
a
EZ2 [C(a,Z2)] = min (CP , CFEM [P [X2 > ρF | X1 < ρF ]]) . (6.14)
6.2.4 Posterior Analysis
Suppose that operators have obtained an outcome for a sampling inspection, X1 = x1 < ρF . The
operators will then choose the best action according to a comparison between the expected costs
with updated information about X2 and M . With the posterior distribution in Equation (6.2),





EZ2|x1 [C(a,Z2 | x1)] = CI + mina
{




Remember that the inspection outcome, X1, is a random variable. We calculate the expected









0 mina EZ2|x1 [C(a,Z2 | x1)] fX1(x1)dx1∫ ρF
0 fX1(x1)dx1
. (6.16)
By calculating a gap between the two expected optimal costs shown in Equations (6.14) and







EZ2|x1 [C(a,Z2 | x1)]
]
(6.17)
For single-component problem, the decision of inspection is contingent only on the timing
of inspection (t1), if other parameters are kept constant. Alternatively, if t1 is fixed, then the
decision of inspection is dependent on the relative inspection cost.
6.3 Multiple-Component Problem
This section expands the model proposed in Section 6.2 to an N -component system problem by
having accumulated the features of the single-component problem. Through the analysis with
the model, we can answer what sample size is the best for the group of homogeneous components.
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Table 6.1: Prior and pre-posterior analysis for multiple-component problem
E Z A X





analysis outcomes components · · · , x(N)2
Pre Each inspected x
(i)
1 and a
(i) for each i x
(1)
2 ,
-posterior component n s
(−i)
n−1 (i = 1, 2, · · · , n) · · · , x
(n)
2
analysis Un-inspected sn a
(non) for all the non- x
(n+1)
2 ,
components inspected components · · · , x(N)2
In the N -components problem, operators can select an inspection sample size, n, which
represents the action at the inspection stage, e(t1) = n. Note n = 0 means no inspection.




1 , · · · , x
(n)
1 ), operators
can choose a set of actions for the N components, a(t1) = (a
(1), a(2), · · · , a(N)). They then





2 , · · · , x
(N)
2 ), obtained by following a mathematically modelled stochastic degradation
process, which has an unknown parameter, M . As the size of sampling inspection, n, increases,
operators can reduce uncertainty in their estimation for X2 through the observed x
(i)
1 and updated




1 , · · · , x
(n)
1 ). For the n components to be
inspected, we consider the upper path of the decision tree in Figure 4.1, and for un-inspected
components, we calculate the possible consequences based on the lower path of the decision tree.
The problem is summarized in Table 6.1. Note that a(prior), a(i), and a(non) are one of the two
actions: replace (a1) and do-not-replace (a2).
6.3.1 Random Variables
The random variables that affect the total expected cost are summarized as a vector, Z3 =
(M,X1, Sn−1, X2). X1, X2, and Sn−1 are conditional independent variables, which are
independent if µ is known. Because of the additivity characteristics of the gamma process,
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the probability density function of Sn−1 is derived as follows:
fSn−1(sn−1 | µ) = ga(sn−1;nt1/ν2, 1/µν2). (6.18)






























Figure 6.1 illustrates the joint distribution of X1 and Sn−1 when n = 10.
With inspection outcomes of n components at t1, the posterior distribution of M becomes










Note that the posterior distribution is still inverse-gamma distribution, which is the conjugate
distribution for the gamma distribution. With the posterior distribution, we can calculate the
expected costs of both inspected and un-inspected components.
Based on the posterior distribution, the distribution of ∆X is derived as follows:
f∆X|X1,Sn−1(∆x | x1, sn−1) =
∫ ∞
0


































Figure 6.1: Joint distribution of X1 and S9 (n = 10)
6.3.2 Prior Analysis
The total cost is functional on a replacement action, A, and random variables, Z3 =
(M,X1, Sn, X2). In the prior analysis, since n = 0, the vector of Z3 becomes the same as
Z2, which is used for single-component problem. Since there is no observation results for prior
analysis, the optimal decisions for every components are the same. The optimal decisions can be
derived by Equation (6.14).
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6.3.3 Posterior Analysis





1 , · · · , x
(n)
1 . In a general problem, we have to evaluate all possible combinations
of each component’s state, and doing so is one of the difficulties of applying the VoI concept
to maintenance problems. However, with the gamma process model and its conjugate prior









n−1, as a representative random variable of all possible outcomes.
With these modified posterior distribution and random variables, we can calculate the
pre-posterior costs for both inspected and un-inspected components. By summing up the value
for each component, we can derive the ENGS of a system.
6.3.4 Pre-posterior Analysis
Since the prior distribution of M is the same as in the single-component problem, and the prior
cost for both inspected and un-inspected components is the same as the one defined in Section
6.2.3, for convenience, we rewrite the prior cost as follows:
min
a
EZ3 [C(a,Z3)] = mina {CP , CFEM [P [X2 > ρF ]]} . (6.22)
For the ith inspected component, the operator makes the replacement decision based on two pieces
of evidence. The first one is the actual condition of the component, x
(i)
1 . Without measurement
error, this inspection outcome eliminates completely the temporal uncertainty. The second piece,
which is indirect, is the sum of conditions of the other n− 1 components, denoted by s(−i)n−1. The
sum reduces the parameter uncertainty by contributing to the updating of the model parameter
of the gamma process.
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Inspected Components
The expected pre-posterior cost for an inspected component is calculated as follows:
Cinsp(a) = EZ3|sn
[





 CI + CP if a = a1CI + CFEM |sn [P [∆X > ρF − x(i)1 ]] if a = a2, (6.23)
After comparing the costs of each action, operators can choose an action that leads to lower
expected cost. For a multiple-component problem, we need to consider the two random variables,
X(i)(t1) and S
(−i)
n−1 , simultaneously, thus the break-even values, which are criteria for choosing a









n−1) = 0 represents the break-even line on which the expected costs from the two









∆X > ρF − x(i)1
]]
. (6.24)
Then, with the break-even values, we can describe the minimum expected cost as
Coinsp = mina
Cinsp(a)
= CI + min
a
{




∆X > ρF − x(i)1
]]}
=






















1 (n = 10, CI =
3, CP = 10, andCF = 100)
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Un-inspected Components
Although an un-inspected component has no obtaining information for its own, operators can
improve the estimation of its condition at t2 through reducing parameter uncertainty. With the
posterior distribution in Equation (6.20), the expected cost for an un-inspected component is
derived as
Cun(a) = EZ3|sn [C(a,Z3 | e2, n, sn)]
=
 CP if a = a1CFEM |sn [P [X2 > ρF ]] if a = a2, (6.26)
Similar to Equation (3.8), we define the break-even value for the sum of the observation, snb, as
it satisfies the following equation:











CP , CFEM |sn [P [X2 > ρF ]]
}
=
 CP if sn > snbCFEM |sn [P [X2 > ρF ]] if sn ≤ snb . (6.28)
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6.3.5 Optimal Decision for Inspection
The ENGS is defined as the difference between prior and pre-posterior expected costs, represented
respectively, as
Cprior(n) = N min
a
EZ3 [C(a,Z3 | e2)] (6.29)




+ (N − n)ESn [Coun] (6.30)
We can obtain the ENGS(n) thus:
ENGS(n) = Cprior − Cprepost (6.31)
Then, we can derive the optimal sample size, no, with which operators will obtain the highest
ENGS, as follows:




The calculation of ENGS involves the evaluation of several multi-dimensional integrations and
minimization operators. For example, in Equation (6.30), the first term involves an integration




n−1. The two variables are dependent on each other, unconditional on
µ; that is, they are conditional independent. Although the joint probability density function can
be analytically derived, large values in gamma functions make numerical calculation difficult. To
calculate these multiple-integrations, we employ a numerical calculation method, Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC). How the MCMC simulations are organized with minimization operators
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is explained in this section. The original algorithms are introduced first, and two approximation
methods, memoization and PMF, are adopted to reduce the computational cost.
6.4.1 Gibbs Sampling
With MCMC, a set of random variables can be simulated from a joint probability density function.
One of the most-popular MCMC methods is Gibbs sampling, whose underlying Markov chain
consists of a series of conditional probability density functions. In this study, since the conditional
probability density functions of unknown variables are given, the Gibbs sampling approach is
employed.
To generate a sample of Nsim sets of (µ,∆x) from the joint probability density function,
fM (µ,∆x | x1, sn−1), we use the conditional distributions
fM (µ | x1,∆x, sn−1) = Iga
(
µ;α+
(n− 1)t1 + t2
ν2
, β +














The algorithm can be summarized as in Algorithm 1. Note that Nburn−in is the size of a burn-in
period, where the obtained sample seems to be biased and is not used for further calculation. As
in Algorithm 1, to generate (µ, x1, sn−1), we use the conditional distributions




















The algorithm can be summarized as in Algorithm 2.
112
Algorithm 1 Gibbs sampling for (µ,∆x) given (x1, sn−1)
Obtain (x1, sn−1)
Set (µ0,∆x0).
for i from 1 to Nburn−in +Nsim do
Generate µi from fM (µ | x1,∆x, sn−1)
Generate ∆xi from f(∆x | µ, x1, sn−1)
end for
Algorithm 2 Gibbs sampling for (µ, x1, sn−1)
Set (µ0, x01, s
0
n−1).
for i from 1 to Nburn−in +Nsim do
Generate µi from fM (µ | xi−11 , s
i−1
n−1)
Generate xi1 from fX1|M (x1 | µi)
Generate sin−1 from fSn−1|M (sn−1 | µi)
end for
6.4.2 Evaluation of ENGS
The calculation processes of ENGS for single- and multiple-component problems are described as
computational algorithms.
Single-Component Problem
To derive EGNS, the expected prior and pre-posterior costs derived respectively in Equations
(6.13) and (6.16) need to be numerically calculated. Algorithm 3 illustrates how to obtain the
expected prior cost. Given µ from the prior distribution, fM (µ), the probability of failure is
derived using cumulative density function, FX2(ρF ). The expectation is calculated through Monte
Carlo simulation (MCS).
Algorithm 4 explains the simulation process of the expected pre-posterior cost. After x1 and
sn−1 are generated through MCMC (Gibbs sampling), µ is simulated from a posterior distribution,
fM (µ | x1). Given µ, the probability of failure is calculated. Note that NK and NJ are the
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Algorithm 3 Calculation of expected prior cost
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− FX2(ρF ), using fX2|M (x2 | µk)
end for
Calculate EZ2 [C(a2,Z2)] ≈
∑NK
k=1 CF (1−FX2 (ρF ))
NK
Determine mina EZ2 [C(a,Z2)]
Algorithm 4 Calculation of expected pre-posterior cost: Single-component
Generate NJ of x1 from fM (µ, x1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | x1,j) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− F∆X,k(ρF − x1,j), using f(∆x | µk)
Calculate CF (1− F∆X,k(ρF − x1,j))
end for












j=1 mina EZ2|x1,j [C(a,Z2|e1,x1,j)]
NJ
simulation sample sizes for inner and outer loops, respectively.
Multiple-Component Problem
Algorithm 3 is also used for multiple-component problems; the expected prior cost is the cost for
a single-component multiplied by N . As described in Section 6.3.4, the expected pre-posterior
costs for inspected and un-inspected components need to be separately considered. For inspected
components, the algorithm used to numerically calculate the expected pre-posterior cost is as
in Algorithm 5. The algorithm for un-inspected components has the same logic, but a slight
difference exists in calculating the probability of failure in the internal loop of the algorithm, as
follows in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 5 Calculation of expected pre-posterior cost: Multiple-component (inspected)
Generate NJ sets of vector, (x1, sn−1), from fM (µ, x1, sn−1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | x1,j , sn−1,j) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− F∆X,k(ρF − x1,j), using f(∆x | µk)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CF (1− F∆X,k(ρF − x1,j))
end for












j=1 mina EZ3|sn [C(a,Z3|e1,n,x1,j ,sn−1,j)]
NJ
Algorithm 6 Calculation of expected pre-posterior cost: Multiple components (un-inspected)
Generate NJ of sn = x1 + sn−1, from fM (µ, x1, sn−1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | sn,j) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− FX2,k(ρF ), using fX2|M (x2 | µk)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CF (1− FX2,k(ρF ))
end for
Calculate EZ3|sn [CF (1− FX2,k(ρF ))] ≈
∑NK
k=1 CF (1−FX2,k(ρF ))
NK








j=1 mina EZ3|sn [C(a,Z3|e2,n,sn,j)]
NJ
6.4.3 Approximate Methods for ENGS Evaluation
To reduce computational cost, we discretize the continuous random variables and adopt two
methods: memoization and probability mass function (PMF) method.
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Method 1: Memoization Technique
Memoization is used to speed up computational calculations by storing the results of previous
calculations and returning them when the same inputs occur again. First, the space of the
observation result, X1, is discretized. Here, x
disc
1,j is a discretized value and represents x1 around
it. Then, once a reasonable range of possible x1 has been determined, the variation of the input
of x1 becomes finite. Due to the limited number of inputs, the memorization technique speeds up
the algorithm. Algorithm 7 is for simulating the expected pre-posterior cost with memoization
technique.
For a single-component problem, Algorithm 4 is modified to become Algorithm 7. Similarly,
memorization is applied to Algorithms 5 and 6 for inspected and un-inspected components in a
multiple-component problem, as shown in Algorithms 8 and 9, respectively.
Method 2: Probability Mass Function
The basic idea of the method introduced in this section is simple and common. Operators just
need to use PMFs instead of PDFs, although this idea has a specific name, “PMF method,”
in this thesis for convenience. This method is meaningful only if the PDF can be analytically
derived, although the algorithms with MCS or MCMC are possible for any situations. Thus,
by combining the gamma process model for the degradation process with its conjugate prior
distribution, inverse gamma, for a parameter, µ, we can derive analytical joint and marginal
distributions of random variables without using MCS or MCMC. By the definition of probability










Algorithm 7 Memoization method: Single-component
Discretize the field of X1
Generate NJ of x1 from fM (µ, x1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Obtain the closest discretized variable, xdisc1,j
if xdisc1,j has never selected before then
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | xdisc1,j ) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− F∆X,k(ρF − xdisc1,j ), using f(∆x | µk)


































disc) and fX(x) denote the PMF and PDF of X, respectively; w is the interval of
the discretized value of X. When w is small enough, the PMF can be approximated as follows:
fXdisc(x
disc
j ) ≈ wfX(xdiscj ). (6.38)












Algorithm 8 Memoization method: Multiple-component (inspected)
Discretize the two dimensional field, (X1, Sn−1)
Generate NJ sets of (x1, sn−1) from fM (µ, x1, sn−1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Obtain the closest pair of discretized variables, (xdisc1,j , s
disc
n−1,j)
if (xdisc1,j , s
disc
n−1,j) has never selected before then
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | xdisc1,j , sdiscn−1,j) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− F∆X,k(ρF − xdisc1,j ), using f(∆x | µk)












Determine mina EZ3|xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,j
[
C(a,Z3 | e1, n, xdisc1,j , sdiscn−1,j
]
else
Obtain mina EZ3|xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,j
[





















Algorithm 9 Memoization method: Multiple-component (un-inspected)
Discretize the field of Sn
Generate NJ of sn = x1 + sn−1 from fM (µ, x1, sn−1) using Gibbs sampling
for j from 1 to NJ do
Obtain the closest discretized variable, sdiscn,j
if sdiscn,j has never selected before then
Generate NK of µ from fM (µ | sdiscn,j ) using MCS
for k from 1 to NK do
Calculate probability of failure, 1− FX2,k(ρF ), using f(∆x | µk)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CF (1− FX2,k(ρF ))
end for
Calculate EZ3|sdiscn,j [CF (1− FX2,k(ρF ))] ≈
∑NK
























Algorithm 10 PMF method: Single-component
Discretize the field of X1




Discretize the field of X2
Calculate an expected probability of failure, EM |xdisc1,j
[
1− F∆X(ρF − xdisc1,j )
]
,
using f(∆x | x1,j)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CFEM |xdisc1,j
[













j∈J mina EZ2|xdisc1,j [C(a,Z2 | e1, x1,j)] fXdisc(x
disc
1,j )
where J is the set of all numbers for descretized X and is a finite integer. With the subset of J ,










Based on the approximated PMF method, Algorithms 4, 5, and 6 are modified as Algorithms
10, 11, and 12, respectively.
6.4.4 Efficiency of Algorithms
To illustrate the efficiency of the algorithms, 100 of ENGSs are simulated with each combination
of the simulation sample sizes of outer and inter loops, NJ and NK , respectively. Oakley et al.
(2010) show that the simulation sample size of an outer loop largely contributes to reducing the
standard deviation in simulation results, although the sample size of an inner loop changes the
results somewhat. We confirm the influence of each simulation sample size and compare the
results of original and memoization methods with large NJ and small NK . For this process, we
use Intel Core(TM)2 Duo with CPU 2.80 GHz and RAM 4.00 GB.
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Algorithm 11 PMF method: Multiple-component (inspected)
Discretize the two dimensional field, (X1, Sn−1)
for j in J do
for k in K do
Calculate fXdisc,Sdiscn−1
(xdisc1,j , sn−1,k)
Calculate an expected probability of failure, EM |xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,k
[
1− F∆X,k(ρF − xdisc1,j )
]
,
using f(∆x | xdisc1,j , sn−1,k)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CFEM |xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,k
[
1− F∆X,k(ρF − xdisc1,j )
]
Determine mina EZ3|xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,k
[












k∈K mina EZ3|xdisc1,j ,sdiscn−1,j
[




Tables 6.2 and 6.3 summarize the results of the simulations; an average, a standard deviation,
and a simulation time (minute) of each simulation setting are compared to one another. Table
6.2 demonstrates the same conclusion about the efficient balance of NJ and NK . Increasing NJ
reduces the standard deviation more than that of NK . This result consistent with the insights
from the study by Oakley et al. (2010).
Table 6.3 indicates that the PMF method is more accurate and computationally more efficient
than the other two methods, although, as a Monte Carlo tequnique, the memoization method is
more efficient than the original method, with almost the same average and standard deviations.
For illustrative purpose, the simulation results of the two approximation methods are compared
for n from 1 to 50. Figure 6.3 indicates that the results from the two methods match well,
although the plots with the memoization method has errors obtained through MCSs.
121
Algorithm 12 PMF method: Multiple-component (un-inspected)
Discretize the field of Sn
for k in K do
Calculate fSdiscn (sn,k)
Calculate an expected probability of failure, EM |sdiscn,k [1− FX2,k(ρF )], using fX2|Sn(x2 | sn,k)
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CFEM |sdiscn,k [1− FX2,k(ρF )]
Determine mina EZ3|sdiscn,k
[















We demonstrate the VoI-based approach using an example in which we impose several initial
settings: N = 100, CF = 100, CP = 10, CI = 1, t1 = 25, t2 = 30, 1/ν
2 = 9, and ρF = 3.0.
These settings represent the maintenance problem of feeder channels in the CANDU 600. Based
on observed data from the feeder channels, a parameter uncertainty for µ is set as a random
variable, whose prior distribution for µ is given as Iga (µ; 1102, 97.84). With the PMF method,
Equation (2.6) is numerically solved.
6.5.1 Single-Component Problem
For the given single-component problem, the ENGS is calculated at 1.51; the operators
should inspect the component to make better maintenance decisions. The expected prior and
pre-posterior costs are 3.65 and 2.14, respectively. This result indicates that if the inspection
cost, CI , is less than 2.51, the optimal decision is “inspect the component.”
Figure 6.4 shows the ENGS for each possible combination of CF and CP , and indicates that
the ENGS is almost proportional to CP /CF ; as CF increases or CP decreases, operators are
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Table 6.2: Computational efficiency with different outer and inner simulation sample sizes
Method Original method
Outer sample size (NJ) 100 1,000 1,000
Inner sample size (NK) 1,000 100 1,000
Average 18.7 12.2 13.0
Standard deviation 49.1 16.8 19.4
Time (minute) 26.4 26.3 60.2
Table 6.3: Computational efficiency with the original and two approximated methods
Method Original method Memoization method PMF method
Outer sample size (NJ) 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000 10,000 100,000 N.A.
Inner sample size (NK) 1,000 100 100 1,000 100 100 N.A.
Average 13.0 13.1 12.9 12.4 13.2 12.9 12.8
Standard deviation 19.4 6.0 1.8 18.0 5.5 1.8 0
Time (minute) 60.2 60.2 411.9 36.6 21.3 95.5 9.2
expected to obtain higher ENGS. The ENGS has its peak when CP /CF is around 5% and drops
off as CP /CF becomes smaller than that peak value. This tendency indicates an important
characteristic of the VoI; VoI rises more when additional information has a high potential to
reverse decisions originally based on the initial condition and prediction model. Since P [X2 > ρF ]
with the initial settings of 0.037, when CP /CF is around that value, operators cannot confidently
make their decision relying only on their current information.
6.5.2 Multiple-Component Problem
The optimal sample size is numerically obtained for a multiple-component inspection problem.
We use the same initial settings. Without inspection, the optimal action for the prior analysis is
a2, “do-not-replace.” For each sample size, the cost for an inspected/un-inspected component is
calculated, and consequently, the ENGS is derived, as shown in Figure 6.5. The optimal sample
size is 100.
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Figure 6.3: ENGS of the PMF and memoization (NJ = 100, 000 and NK = 100) methods for
each sample size (CI = 3, CP = 10, and CF = 100)
Quantitative Classification of Optimal Sample Sizes
Figure 6.5 illustrates the sources of the ENGS for each sample size. As a sample size becomes
larger, the contribution of inspected components surprisingly tends to linearly increase because
the expected optimal cost for an inspected component, C̄oinsp, is almost constant with respect to n.
This result indicates that the VoI from inspected components is obtained mostly by reducing the
temporal uncertainty instead of the parameter uncertainty. On the other hand, the contribution
of un-inspected components, obtained by reducing parameter uncertainty, has its peak around
n = 20.
The extent of the constant characteristics of C̄oinsp is examined for different amounts of prior
information, represented by the variance of the prior distribution. If a sampling inspection greatly
reduces C̄oinsp through parameter updating, C̄
o
insp would no longer be constant with respect to
sample size. Figure 6.6 shows that the constant characteristics are universal. Although the
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Figure 6.4: ENGS for each possible combination of CF and CP for a single-component problem
with parameter uncertainty (CI = 1)
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Figure 6.5: Contributions of inspected and un-inspected components for ENGS (CI = 1, CP =
10, and CF = 100)
expected optimal cost becomes more costly as the amount of prior information decreases (the
variance increases), the expected costs do not change for any sample size.



















where C̄oun(n) = ESn [Coun]. Then, based on Equation (6.31), the derivative of ENGS(n) with
respect to n is obtained as follows:
dENGS (n)
dn





Figure 6.6: C̄oinsp in cases with different amounts of prior information (CI = 1, CP = 10, and
CF = 100)





= C̄oun(N)− C̄oinsp − 0 > 0
⇔ C̄oinsp < C̄oun(N), (6.42)















where we assume C̄oun(0) = Cprior. Since
dC̄oun(n)
dn > 0 for any n, if C̄
o
insp > Cprior, then n
o = 0.
An insight from the results is that operators may be able to avoid a part or all of the calculation
steps. Based on Equations (6.42) and (6.43),
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• If C̄oinsp < Coun(N), the optimal sample size is always n = N ;
• If C̄oinsp > Cprior, the optimal sample size is always n = 0;




The contribution of un-inspected components is large when operators have only a little prior
information, where the contribution rapidly increases and peaks at less than n = 10. On the
other hand, when operators have much prior information, the contribution becomes relatively
small, comparable with the contribution of inspected components although its peak can be more
than 0.4N . Thus, a realistic sample size, except n = 0 or n = N , is mostly in the range of
1 ≤ n < 0.4N .
Impact of Cost Balance
The optimal sample size for each case of different inspection costs is analysed as in Figure 6.7.
As the inspection cost increases, the ENGS to be obtained through inspection is reduced. When
CI is 1 or 2, the optimal sample size is 100, which is the population size, because the expected
value of to-be-obtained information is higher than the inspection cost even at n = 100.
When CI ≥ 3, full-inspection is no longer the optimal choice. The optimal sample sizes are
n = 14 for the case of CI = 3 and n = 7 for the case of CI = 4. The ENGS is positive until
n = 40 or n = 13 for the case of CI = 3 or CI = 4, respectively. Figure 6.8 depicts the ENGS
for each sample size in the case of CI = 3. The width of the positive ENGS range, named the
“beneficial sample size range,” represents the flexibility of size-of-sampling inspection decisions.
If the range is wide, operators can reasonably take a conservative sample size that is not optimal
but is still beneficial for them. In these cases, the expected prior cost is in between the expected
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Figure 6.7: ENGS for different inspection costs, CI (CP = 10 and CF = 100)
Figure 6.8: ENGS for the case with CI = 3, CP = 10, and CF = 100)
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Figure 6.9: Optimal sample size for different failure costs, CF (CI = 3 and CP = 10)
pre-posterior costs for inspected and un-inspected components; the benefit of reducing temporal
uncertainty is not enough to compensate for the inspection cost, but the benefit of reducing
parameter uncertainty contributes to making the ENGS positive. When n is more than four, the
optimal action at the inspection stage is “do-nothing.”
The influence of the failure and replacement costs, CF and CP , respectively, on the optimal
sample size is analysed. As CF becomes larger, the optimal sample size increases and reaches
the population size (see Figure 6.9). In contrast, when CP is changed as shown in Figure 6.10,
the optimal sample size has a maximum around CP = 7. These results indicate that the optimal
sample size is more sensitive with CF than CP .
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Figure 6.10: Optimal sample size for different replacement costs, CP (CI = 3 and CF = 100)
Impact of Prior Information
The influence of the amount of prior information is analysed as in Figure 6.11. With the fixed ratio
of α/β, α and β are changed from 10 % to 130 % of the original values, (α, β) = (1102, 97.8).
As the amount of prior information increases, the optimal sample size linearly decreases and
drops to zero at 130 %. This explains that a certain amount of information exists at which
operators should not take into account additional information that reduces uncertainties in
terms of cost-benefit analysis. At between 120 % and 130 % of the amount of the original
information, the ENGS becomes negative over all n, although the peak of the ENGS contributed
by un-inspected components continues to linearly decrease even after 130 %.
Impact of Inspection Timing
We have compared costs with different inspection timings. Figure 6.12 shows that the sooner
operators can carry out an inspection, the smaller the ENGS value they will obtain; however, the
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Figure 6.11: Optimal sample sizes for different prior information (CI = 3, CP = 10, and CF =
100)
optimal sample sizes are similar. In cases of t1 = 25, t1 = 20, and t1 = 15, the optimal sample
sizes are n = 13, n = 10, and n = 0, respectively. When the probability of failure before t1 is
significantly low and ignorable, the later operators inspect components, the more they can reduce
both the temporal and parameter uncertainties.
6.6 Summary
This chapter has developed the VoI-based sample size determination method for the maintenance
decision-making problem under an assumption of dependent components through shared
parameter uncertainty. Based on the model defined in Chapter 5, we have developed the
model so as to deal with both temporal (aleatory) and parameter (epistemic) uncertainties in
the maintenance problem. With the gamma process, we demonstrated how the observation
and following updating process can be simplified in the mathematical equations. Computational
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Figure 6.12: ENGSs with different inspection timings (CI = 3, CP = 10, and CF = 100)
algorithms are introduced and computationally efficient algorithms have been discussed. We have
demonstrated the proposed method through a numerical example. In addition to the optimal
sample size, we propose a new index for sampling inspection, the “beneficial sample size range,”
which represents the flexibility of SSD. By changing major parameters of the model, we explored
how the proposed method can apply to a variety of cases.
The major insights found for sample size determination strategies are as follows:
• The optimal sample size is sensitive against parameters of cost and prior distribution;
• The most sensitive parameter is inspection cost;
• If C̄oinsp < Coun(N), the optimal sample size is always n = N ;
• If C̄oinsp > Cprior, the optimal sample size is always n = 0;






Two-Inspection Problem: Value of
Information Analysis
Repeated inspection has been a common situation in condition-based maintenance studies.
Periodic inspection, which is one of the repeated inspection policies, is widely used, for instance,
Pandey et al. (2009). Under the inspection policy, a component is inspected periodically without
consideration of different inspection options. The policy is simple, flexible, and an optimal
solution is easy to find, but sample size determination (SSD) cannot be included in the analysis.
The inspection actions need to be defined as a part of a sequential decision problem. A series
of studies has developed optimization approaches for the condition-based maintenance problem
including inspection actions by modelling the problem as a partially observable Markov decision
process (POMDP).
Studies using POMDPs still use a fixed action interval but enable decision makers to decide
an inspection action at each horizon. These studies successfully generalize the discrete case
of inspection optimization in a condition-based maintenance problem for a single-component
system(Papakonstantinou and Shinozuka, 2014b,c,a; Papakonstantinou and Memarzadeh, 2017).
The proposed method discretizes all the factors in the problem: state of the component,
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inspection and maintenance actions, and observation outcomes. Schöbi and Chatzi (2016)
extend the POMDP model for continuous-state problem. However, these studies focus only
on a single-component system and cannot be applied for a multi-component problem. The SSD
problem cannot be formulated with their approaches. Memarzadeh and Pozzi (2016) propose
a method for multi-component system and evaluate the expected value of sample information
(EVSI) for two predetermined scenarios: optimistic and pessimistic. The study offers insights
into how much impact the first inspection has for the given scenarios, but it cannot explain how
the first inspection affects the following inspection actions.
This chapter describes how to determine the sample size for a multiple-component system
maintenance problem with multiple inspections. The study adopts dynamic programming as a
basis for the method for modelling and solving the problem. First, the background and main
ideas of dynamic programming are introduced. Classifying the related studies that use dynamic
programming for maintenance problems, we highlight the limitations of these studies. Similar
to Chapter 6, we explain how the gamma process contributes for modelling a condition-based
maintenance model with multiple-inspection problems. A mathematical derivation process for
the net benefit of inspection (ENGS) guides readers to an understanding of maintenance problems
as dynamic programming problems. Numerical analysis with a real case study shows the
applicability of the stated method in realistic situations.
7.1 Problem Definition
Let us assume that operators are going to choose an inspection and maintenance policy for an
N -component system in operation. The situation is the same as that in the problem described in
Chapter 6, except that there is now the chance of a second inspection and/or maintenance at t2.
Note that, in this chapter, t1 and t2 denote the first and second inspection/maintenance times,
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Figure 7.1: Decision tree for two-inspection problem
and t3 is the system-decommission time.
We have two decision-making horizons, t1 and t2, and each horizon is divided into two
stages: inspection and maintenance. The operators are at t1 and need to take a combination of
inspection and maintenance actions, which are, respectively, deciding on the size of the inspection
sampling and making a decision to replace or not for each component. At the inspection stage,
the inspection decision is for the whole system (all components), whereas at the maintenance
stage, decisions are for individual components. Specifically, during the inspection stage, the
operators determine a cost-effective scope (size) for the sampling inspection, n(i), and during the
maintenance stage at ti, they need to decide which (if any) components to replace and consider all
components individually (“replace,” a
(i)
1 , or “do-nothing,” a
(i)
2 ). As a rough sketch, the problem
can be illustrated as a repeat of the problem used in Chapter 6 (see Figure 7.1).
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7.2 Dynamic Programming for Condition-based Maintenance
Dynamic programming was characterized and studied by Bellman (1957) based on statistical
sequential analysis (Wald, 1947). Dynamic programming describes a class of problems that can
be divided into sub-problems. A decision-maker first optimizes these sub-problems and gradually
extends his/her focusing problem toward the whole problem. For example, if the problem involves
a multiple-horizon (times) decision-making problem, the analysis starts from the last horizon,
and then the focusing horizon moves backward, using the results obtained for later horizons. The
optimized value at a certain horizon, V (xt), can be simplified as a Bellman equation:
V (xt) = max
at∈A
(R(xt, at) + γV (T (xt, at)), (7.1)
where xt and at are a state of a system and a decision maker’s action at t, respectively; R(xt, at)
is the reward obtained at t; T (xt, at) is a transition for the next horizon given xt and at; and
γ denotes a constant discount rate with which we estimate a net present value. When T (xt, at)
represents probabilistic transition, the decision maker needs to evaluate an expected future value
as follows:
V (xt) = max
at∈A
(
R(xt, at) + γ
∫
xt+1∈X
V (xt+1)P [xt+1 | xt, at] dxt+1
)
. (7.2)
Note that summation is used instead of integration if the state-space of a system is discrete.
Although dynamic programming has been developed and applied primarily in computer science,
several studies have adopted it for maintenance problems. Since general dynamic programming
is computationally expensive, its simplified forms, Markov decision process (MDP) and POMDP,
have been widely adopted.
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7.2.1 Markov Decision Process
MDP is defined as a mixture of a Markov process and a decision-making process. In a Markov
process, a future condition depends only on a current state. In other words, it is memoryless; the
history of previous conditions does not affect its stochastic transition to the future condition. A
gamma process is one example of a continuous-state Markov process. By modelling a component’s
degradation as a Markov process, maintenance decision problems have been defined as MDPs.
For simple formulations, a discrete-state Markov process is adopted in most studies. For
example, Ahmadi (2016) presents a condition-based maintenance model based on an MDP for
a single-component system. Nguyen et al. (2013) apply a MDP model for analysing optimal
maintenance, including the influence of spare parts inventory.
7.2.2 Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
To include the inspection decision problem in a condition-based maintenance optimization,
POMDP has been developed based on MDP. Instead of an actual state of a component, the
belief of a decision maker is updated based on observation results. POMDP has been developed
in reinforced learning, an area of machine learning, but has gained attention in maintenance
decision problems in recent years. In the context of structural health monitoring, inspection
actions are combined with maintenance actions, and optimal policies for each possible initial
belief are determined. For example, Faddoul et al. (2011) analyse a two sequence inspection
problem through which they explain the approach in a POMDP. Zhang and Revie (2017) develop




This chapter builds the model for a two-inspection problem in which the operators’ primary focus
is determining the sample size for the first inspection, n(1). In that context, the prior analysis
means the optimization of the expected cost without the first sampling inspection and “with”
the second sampling inspection. In short, the prior analysis consists of the pre-posterior analysis
described in Chapter 6. Based on the problem in Chapter 6, the single-component problem is
first stated for illustrative reasons, and the multiple-component model is next introduced.
The assumptions we set in this stated problem, which have already been introduced in
Chapters 5 and 6, are re-written as follows:
• Degradation of components follows the gamma process model;
• Components are statistically independent of one another;
• The probability of a replaced component failing before t3 is negligible;
• Every component survives until t1 (x1 < ρF ).
7.3.1 Random Variables
The vector of the random variables, Z4 = (M,X1, X2, X3), is the source of uncertainties. The
ENGS is obtained by reducing these uncertainties through observing Z4. The probability density
functions (PDFs) and cumulative density functions (CDFs) of X1 and X2 are the same as those
shown in Section 6.2.2, although several notations need to be modified from ∆t and ∆x to ∆t12
and ∆x12. The condition at t3, X3, is estimated based on the PDF, as follows:
fX3|M,X1(x3 | µ, x1) = g(x3 − x1), (7.3)
fX3|M,X2(x3 | µ, x2) = g(x3 − x2), (7.4)
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The increments of the degradation level over ∆t13 = t3 − t1, ∆X13, and ∆t23 = t3 − t2, ∆X23,
have the following PDFs
f∆X13|M,X1(∆x13 | µ, x1) = g(∆x13), (7.5)
f∆X23|M,X2(∆x23 | µ, x2) = g(∆x23). (7.6)
The joint distribution of M and X3 given X1 = x1 is
fM,X3|X1(µ, x3 | x1)































The marginal distribution of X3 given X1 = x1 is
fX3|X1(x3 | x1) =
∫ ∞
0






















The joint distribution of M and X3 given X2 = x2 is
fM,X3|X2(µ, x3 | x2)
































The marginal distribution of X3 given X2 = x2 is
fX3|X2(x3 | x2) =
∫ ∞
0

































































































7.3.2 Baseline Case: No inspection at t1
The major structure of the optimization analysis without the first sampling inspection is actually
the same as the structure of the pre-posterior analysis in Section 6.2, except for the shift of the
time horizon and the additional maintenance decision at t1. In both cases there is a chance to
inspect once in the whole decision-making process. The expected optimal cost with no inspection
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at either t1 or t2 is calculated thus:
EZ4|X2<ρF
[

























where a1 = (e
(1), e(2), a(1), a(2)) is the vector of the inspection and maintenance action taken at





(j) = ei and a
(j) = ai, respectively; a
(j)o means the optimal action
at tj .
If another situation arises in which operators have an inspection result X2 = x2, the expected











= CI + min
a(2)
(




Similar to the cost in Equation (6.16), if operators do not actually have inspection results, X2
needs to be considered as a random variable. The expected cost with respect to X2 becomes
EZ4|X2<ρF
[
































Note that this expected optimal cost is for the case of the component not failing before t2, whose
probability is FX2(ρF ). Based on the derived expected costs, the ENGS
(2), which is the net
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benefit of inspection at t2 (not t1), is derived as follows:
ENGS(2)(e(2) | e(1)2 , a
(1)
2 ) = EZ4|X2<ρF
[














(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
.(7.18)
Thus, operators can determine the optimal inspection action at t2 that leads to lower expected
cost than the other option as follows:
e(2)o = arg max
e(2)
ENGS(2)(e(2) | e(1)2 , a
(1)
2 ). (7.19)
At the maintenance stage at t1, the operators choose an action between a1, replacement, and
a2, no-action. The choice is based on which option has a lower expected cost. The “prior” cost




CP , FX2(ρF )EZ4|X2<ρF
[




(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
+CF (1− FX2(ρF ))) , (7.20)
where EZ4|X2<ρF
[
C(a1,Z4 | e(1)2 , e(2)o, a
(1)
2 , a
(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
is the expected cost with optimal
inspection and action at t2, e
(2)o and a(2)o, respectively, given e
(1)
2 . The consequence of each
combination of inspection and action options is summarized in the lower half (e(1) = e2 case) of

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7.3: Costs arising between t1 and t3
e(1) x1 a
(1) State e(2) x2 EZ4|X2<ρF
[
C(a1,Z4 | a(1)2 , a(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
e1 X a1 —
a2 Fail —
Survive e1 X CI + mina(2)(CP , CFEM|X2 [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
e2 × mina(2)(CP , CF
EM|X1 [F∆X12 (ρF−x1)−F∆X13 (ρF−x1)]
EM|X1 [F∆X12 (ρF−x1)]
)
e2 × a1 —
a2 Fail —
Survive e1 X CI + mina(2)(CP , CFEM|X2 [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2))]
e2 × mina(2)(CP , CF
EM [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
)









e1 X a1 CI + CP
a2 CI + CFEM|X1 [1− F∆X12(ρF − x1)]
+EZ4|X2<ρF
[
C(a1,Z4 | e(1)1 , e(2)o, a
(1)
2 , a
(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
EM|X1 [F∆X12(ρF − x1)]
e2 × a1 CP
a2 CFEM [1− FX2(ρF )]
+EZ4|X2<ρF
[
C(a1,Z4 | e(1)2 , e(2)o, a
(1)
2 , a
(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
EM [FX2(ρF )]
7.3.3 Posterior Analysis: Inspection and Maintenance at t2
Suppose that operators have obtained an outcome for a sampling inspection, X1 = x1 < ρF .
The operators will then choose the best action according to a comparison between the expected
costs with updated information about M , X2, and X3. Because of the assumption, a replaced
component will not fail. With the same posterior distribution as in Equation (6.2), the optimal
expected cost arising between t2 and t3, given a
(1) = a2 and e
(2) = e2, is calculated as
EZ4|X2<ρF
[





















EM |X1 [F∆X12(ρF − x1)− F∆X13(ρF − x1)]




When a(1) = a2, e
(2) = e1, and X2 = x2 < ρF are given, the optimal expected cost is
EZ4|X2<ρF
[
























EM |X2 [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
)]
. (7.22)
In the two-inspection problem, the second inspection decision is included in the posterior
analysis part. Based on the derived expected costs, the ENGS(2), which is the net benefit of
inspection at t2, is derived as follows:
ENGS(2)(e(2) | e(1)1 , a
(1)
2 , x1) = EZ4|X2<ρF
[


















Thus, given the inspection outcome at t1 as X1 = x1, the optimal inspection action at t2 is
determined as
e(2)o = arg max
e(2)
ENGS(2)(e(2) | e(1)1 , a
(1)
2 , x1). (7.24)
The consequences of inspection and replacement options are summarized in the upper half (e(1) =
e1 case) of Tables 7.1 and 7.2.
7.3.4 Pre-posterior Analysis: Inspection and Maintenance at t1
Given the posterior expected cost for each possible X1, we take an expectation of the posterior






















(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
F∆X12(ρF − x1)
+CF (1− F∆X12(ρF − x1))) , (7.25)
where EZ4|X2<ρF
[
C(a1,Z4 | e(1)1 , e(2)o, a
(1)
2 , a
(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]
is the expected cost with e(2)o and
a(2)o, given e
(1)














By calculating a gap between the two expected optimal costs, we can derive the ENGS(1), which
is the net benefit of inspection at t1, for this single-component problem:
ENGS(1) = Cprior − Cprepost. (7.27)
The consequences of inspection and replacement options are summarized in the upper half (e(1) =
e1 case) of Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
7.3.5 Computational Algorithm
Same as the Chapter 6, the PMF method is applied to calculating the expected pre-posterior cost
for the two-inspection problem. The algorithm for the two-inspection problem with the PMF
method is described as Algorithms 13.
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Algorithm 13 Two-inspection single-component problem with PMF method
Discretize the field of X1




Discretize the field of ∆X12
# For replacement decision at t2 given e
(2) = e1
for each ∆xdisc12,i in I, do
Calculate f(∆xdisc12,i )
Discretize the field of X3
Calculate an expected probability of failure, EM|xdisc1,j ,∆xdisc12,i
[
1− F∆X23(ρF − xdisc1,j −∆xdisc12,i )
]
,
using f(∆x23 | x1,j ,∆xdisc12,i )
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CFEM|xdisc1,j ,∆xdisc12,i
[
1− F∆X23(ρF − xdisc1,j −∆xdisc12,i )
]
Determine a(2)o by comparing the expected costs of taking a1 and a2,
















i∈I mina(2) EZ4|xdisc1,j ,∆xdisc12,i
[









# For replacement decision at t2 given e
(2) = e2
Discretize the field of X3
















using f(∆x12 | x1,j) and f(∆x13 | x1,j)















Determine a(2)o by comparing the expected costs of taking a1 and a2, given x
disc
1,j
# For inspection decision at t2




# For replacement decision at t1
Calculate an expected cost of taking a2, CFEM|xdisc1,j
[








C(a1,Z4 | e(1)1 , e(2)o, a(2)o, xdisc1,j )
]
Determine a(1)o by comparing the expected costs of taking a1 and a2, given x
disc
1,j
























We demonstrate the VoI-based approach using an example in which we impose several initial
settings: CF = 100, CP = 10, CI = 3, t1 = 25, t1 = 27, t3 = 30, 1/ν
2 = 9, and ρF = 3.0. These
settings represent the maintenance problem of a feeder channel in the CANDU 600. Based on
observed data from the feeder channels, a parameter uncertainty for µ is set as a random variable,
whose prior distribution is given as Iga (µ; 1102, 97.84). With the PMF method, Equation (7.27)
is numerically solved.
The ENGS is derived as a negative value, −0.154, which means that the optimal inspection
is e2, “do not inspect,” at t1. Consequently, the optimal action at t1 and inspection at t2 are
determined as a(1)o = a2 and e
(2)o = e1, respectively. If the inspection outcome is less than 2.65,
the optimal action at t2 is a2; otherwise a
(2)o = a1.
Influence of Re-inspection at t2
Although at t1 operators should not inspect the component, the decision-making after taking e
(1)
1




only if the observation outcome at t1 is between 2.42 and 2.5, and the maximum ENGS
(2) is 2.65,
obtained for the case of x1 = 2.45. The ENGS
(2) without inspection at t1 (given e
(1)
2 ) is calculated
as 1.73, which represents the ENGS at t2 for inspection of an as-yet un-inspected component. The
re-inspection priority for an inspected component becomes higher than the first inspection for
an un-inspected component only if 2.44 < x1 < 2.47, which occurs with a probability of 2.55 %.




This section expands the model proposed in Section 7.3 to an N -component system problem.
7.4.1 Additional Assumptions
In addition to the assumptions introduced in Section 7.3, several others are adopted in the
problem:
• Inspected components at t1 will not be re-inspected at t2;
• An upper limit for the inspection sample size exists;
• The sum of the observed degradation level, Sn, is conditionally independent on each
component’s degradation level, X(t);
The first assumption is supported by the numerical results of the single-component problem
in Section 7.3.6. The numerical analysis indicates that only 8.2 % of previously inspected
components have higher priority than un-inspected components, so that the first assumption
becomes reasonable in light of the second assumption by which operators can inspect only the
components with high priority. The second assumption reflects the reality of operations where
full-inspection is not feasible because of limited resources.
For simplification, Sn is derived by using the PDF that is conditionally independent on X
instead of calculating Sn = Sn−1 +X. This approximation becomes reasonable when the sample
size is large enough. Table 7.5 shows the averages and variances of Sn and Sn−1 + x1 when
x1 = 2.5 is given. These two distributions are close enough; the Kullback-Leibler divergence
and the histogram intersection, which are indices showing the difference (similarity) between
distributions, are calculated at 0.0528 and 87.1 %, respectively. Note that the Kullback-Leibler
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Table 7.5: Statistics for Sn and Sn−1 + x1
Sn Sn−1 + x1
Average 22.68 22.91
Variance 0.67 0.52
divergence was first introduced by Kullback and Leibler (1951) and has been used to evaluate
how much one distribution differs from another distribution. For more detail, see Appendix C.
7.4.2 Random Variables




, and variables for a
specific component, W = (X1, X2, X3). The random variables that affect the total expected cost
are summarized as a vector, Z5 = (M,U ,W ). The PDFs for X1, X2, and X3 with only the prior
information are the same as the PDFs in Section 7.3.1. The PDFs for S(1) and S(2), respectively
given n(2) and n(2), are
fS(1)(s
(1) | µ) = ga(s(1);n(1)t1/ν2, 1/µν2), (7.28)
fS(2)(s
(2) | µ, s(1)) = ga(s(2);n(2)t2/ν2, 1/µν2). (7.29)
With the prior distribution of µ, the joint distribution of S(1), X1 and µ is formulated as
fX1,S(1),M (x1, s
(1), µ) = fX1(x1 | µ)fS(1)(s
(1) | µ)fM (µ). (7.30)
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After the observation of S(1) = s(1), the posterior distribution of µ becomes











With the posterior distribution, the PDFs of X2 and S
(2) can be derived as
fX2(x2 | s(1)) =
∫ ∞
0




































































and similarly, the joint distribution of X2 and S














































Once operators observe s(1) and s(2), the PDF of µ is further updated as

















































7.4.3 Baseline Case: No Inspection at t1
The total cost depends on inspection and replacement actions, a2 = (e
(1), e(2), n(1), n(2), a(1), a(2)),
and random variables, Z5 = (M,U ,W ). As in the single-component problem, the optimization
analysis without the first sampling inspection is actually the same as the pre-posterior analysis
in Section 6.3, except for the shift of the time horizon and the additional maintenance decision
at t1. In this section, the expected cost without any inspection is first introduced, and the case
with sampling inspection of n(2) components is analysed for both un-inspected and inspected
components.
No Inspection at Either t1 or t2
If operators have no observation outcome for either t1 or t2, a parameter uncertainty cannot be
updated. Thus, the prior distribution is used for calculating expected cost. The expected optimal





C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e
(2)
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Un-inspected Components at t2
Suppose operators inspect n(2) components at t2 and obtain a sum of the inspected degradation






C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e
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C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e
(2)
2 , n















Inspected Components at t2
The expected cost of a component with inspection at t2, given X2 = x2 and S





C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e
(2)
1 , n
(1) = 0, n(2), a
(1)
2 , x2, s
(2))
]
= CI + min
a(2)
(
CP , CFEM |S(2) [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
)
(7.42)








C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e
(2)
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Table 7.6: Costs arising between t2 and t3 given n
(1) = 0, a(1) = a2, and X2 < ρF : Prior analysis
n(2) s(2) e(2) x2 a
(2) State Cost Probability
n(2) X e1 X a1 CI + CP 1
a2 Fail CI + CF EM |S(2) [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
Survive CI EM |S(2) [F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
e2 × a1 CP 1
a2 Fail CF
E
M|S(2) [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
Survive 0
E
M|S(2) [FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
0 × e2 × a1 CP 1
a2 Fail CF
EM [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
Survive 0
EM [FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
Note that this expected optimal cost is for a case in which the component will not fail before t2,
a case whose probability is FX2(ρF ). The consequences of inspection and replacement options
are summarized in Tables 7.6 and 7.7.
Optimal Inspection at t2
Based on the derived expected costs, the expected cost for each inspection option e(2) is derived
as in Table 7.8. Thus, the ENGS(2) is derived as follows:
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Table 7.7: Costs arising between t1 and t3 given n
(1) = 0, a(1) = a2, and X2 < ρF : Prior analysis
n(2) s(2) e(2) x2 a
(2) EZ5|X2<ρF
[
C(a2,Z5 | a(1)2 , X2 < ρF )
]
n(2) X e1 X a1 CI + CP
a2 CI + CFEM |S(2) [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
e2 × a1 CP
a2 CF
E
M|S(2) [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
0 × e2 × a1 CP
a2 CF
EM [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
Table 7.8: Total costs for inspected and un-inspected components: Prior analysis
n(2) s(2) e(2) x2 EZ5|X2<ρF
[
C(a2,Z5 | a(1)2 , a(2)o, X2 < ρF )
]






CP , CFEM|S(2) [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
)]}






M|S(2) [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
)]
0 × e2 × N mina(2)
(
CP , CF
EM [FX2 (ρF )−FX3 (ρF )]
EM [FX2 (ρF )]
)
The optimal inspection action at t2 is determined as
n(2)o = arg max
n(2)
ENGS(2)(n(2) | n(1) = 0, a(1)2 ). (7.45)
The average cost with the optimal inspection at t2 is
EZ5
[
C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e

























CP , CFEM |S(2) [1− F∆X23(ρF − x2)]
)]}}
. (7.46)
At the maintenance stage at t1, the operators choose an action between a1, replacement, and a2,
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no-action, with which the expected cost is lower than the cost with the other option. The “prior”
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[
C(a2,Z5 | e(1)2 , e





+CF (1− FX2(ρF ))) . (7.47)
7.4.4 Posterior Analysis: Inspection and Maintenance at t2
Suppose that operators have obtained an outcome for a sampling inspection, s(1) and x1. The
operators will then choose the best action according to a comparison between the expected costs,
using updated information about M , X2, X3, and S
(2). The consequences of all inspection and
action options are summarized in Tables 7.9, 7.10, and 7.11.
Un-inspected Components at Either t1 or t2
Even when operators are going to inspect n(1) and n(2) components at t1 and t2, respectively,
they still have N − n(1) − n(2) un-inspected components at either t1 or t2 if N > n(1) + n(2). The
optimal expected cost given a(1) = a2, e
(1) = e2, e
















EM |S(1),S(2) [FX2(ρF )− FX3(ρF )]




Inspected Components at t2 Only
For n(2) components, given a(1) = a2, e
(1) = e2, e
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. (7.49)
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(1), n(2), s(1), s(2), x2)
]}
. (7.50)
Inspected Components at t1 Only
For n(1) components, when a(1) = a2, e
(1) = e1, e
(2) = e2, and X2 = x2 < ρF are given, the
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EM |S(1),S(2) [F∆X12(ρF − x1)− F∆X13(ρF − x1)]




Inspection Decision at t2
In the two-inspection problem, the second inspection decision is included in the posterior analysis
part. Based on the derived expected costs, the ENGS(2) is derived as follows:
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(1), n(2), s(1), s(2), x1)
]
. (7.52)
The optimal sample size at t2 is determined to be
n(2)o = arg max
n(2)





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the pre-posterior analysis, the expected costs with respect to the two random variables, X1 and
S(1), are considered for both un-inspected and inspected components. The detailed consequence
of each option is shown in Tables 7.12 and 7.13.




CP , CFEM |S(1) [1− FX2(ρF )]
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By calculating a gap between the two expected optimal costs, we can derive the ENGS for
this single-component problem:
ENGS(1)(n(1)) = NCprior − (N − n(1))Cprepostun − n(1)C
prepost
insp . (7.56)
Finally, the optimal sample size at t1 is determined to be
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We next demonstrate the VoI-based approach using an example in which we impose several
initial settings: N = 319, CF = 100, CP = 10, CI = 1, t1 = 25, t2 = 27, t3 = 30,
1/ν2 = 9, and ρF = 3.0. Note that the population size represents the number of un-inspected
components of a 380-component system. Let us assume that the prior distribution for µ is given
as Iga (µ; 1102, 97.84), derived from observed data. Let us set the options for inspection sample
size at 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50; the sample size of each inspection is limited to 50. The simulation
algorithms adopt the PMF method introduced in Chapter 6.
7.5.1 Illustration of Proposed Policy
Derived from the backward induction illustrated in Section 7.4, an optimal policy is proposed.
The best sample size at t1 is n
(1)o = 40 with its ENGS of 67.77. The optimal action, a(1)o,
after inspection of 40 components, depends on the inspection’s outcome. Figure 7.2 illustrates
the optimal action for inspected or un-inspected components and its ranges of X1 and S
(1). As
for the 279 un-inspected components, operators will replace them if the sum of the observed
degradation level is more than 96.0. For the 40 inspected components, operators will decide on
an action based on both X1 and S
(1). At t2, the optimal inspection is determined relying on S
(1).
If 90.5 < S(1) ≤ 96.0, the optimal sample size at t2 is 50; otherwise, no inspection is required.
The optimal action at t2, a
(2), is derived based on random variables Z5, and operators determine
policy-a.
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Table 7.15: ENGS of one-inspection problem for each sample size at t1
Inspection n(1)o n(2)o Total expected cost Benefit of inspection
t1 and t2 40 0 or 50 1029.9 112.6
t1 20 0 1088.1 54.4
t2 0 30 1089.8 52.7
No inspection 0 0 1142.5 —
7.5.2 Comparison with One-Inspection Problem
The results of the two-inspection problem are compared with those for a one- or no-inspection
problem, as summarized in Table 7.15. Note that the total expected costs are compared instead
of the ENGS, because the baseline of the analysis (prior analysis) of each problem is different.
The results suggest several insights:
• Inspection at t1 is more effective than one at t2 if only one inspection is allowed;
• The benefit of inspection at both t1 and t2 is more than the sum of the benefits of separate
inspections at t1 and t2;
• Synergy between inspection at t1 and t2 is indicated.
Note that the third insight is obvious because the second insight is observed, although the
marginal influence of reducing parameter uncertainty decreases as the total sample size, n(1)+n(2),
increases.
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Figure 7.2: Optimal action, a(1)o, for each combination of observation outcomes of X1 and S
(1)
given n(1)o = 40
7.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
With the same initial settings except for a focusing parameter, the optimal sample sizes are
derived plus the sensitivities of CI , CP , CF , and the parameters of prior distribution, (α, β), are
discussed. To illustrate the influence of the second inspection at t2, the sensitivity analysis for
the two-inspection problem is compared with the analysis for the one-inspection (t1) problem.
Note that the results of a two-inspection problem always show lower expected costs than the
results of a one-inspection problem, because a one-inspection problem is just a special case of a
two-inspection problem.
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Figure 7.3: Optimal sample size with different CI (CP = 10 and CF = 100)
Impact of Cost Balance
Figure 7.3 illustrates the ENGSs with each CI . Although the general trend is similar to the results
of the one-inspection problem shown in Figure 6.7, the detailed behaviour of the ENGS provides
several insights into the difference between the two problems. In the cases where operators have
a chance to inspect at t2, a moderate inspection option (10 ≤ n ≤ 40) becomes optimal when
3 ≥ CI ≥ 10, which is slightly wider than the range calculated with the one-inspection at t1 case,
3 ≥ CI ≥ 8.
The influence of the replacement cost, CP , and the failure cost, CF , are summarized in
Figures 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. For the sensitivity analysis on CP , the optimal sample size
peaks at around CP = 10 and decreases as CP increases. The moderate inspection options
(n(1) = 10, 20, 30 or 40) become optimal when CP is between 5 and 35. In contrast to the results
for CP , the optimal sample size monotonically and non-linearly increases from 0 to 50 as the CF
changes from 50 to 110. In the two-inspection case, the range of CP or CF , where a moderate
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Figure 7.4: Optimal sample size with different CP (CI = 3 and CF = 100)
inspection option (10 ≤ n ≤ 40) becomes optimal, is wider than their range in the one-inspection
at t1 case.
Impact of Prior Information
The influence of the amount of prior information, which represents the precision of prior
distribution, is analysed as in Figure 7.6. With the fixed ratio of α/β, α and β are changed
from 10 % to 250 % of the original values, (α, β) = (1102, 97.8). Similar to the results of the
one-inspection problem, the less prior information operators have, the more the sample size is
optimal, although the optimal sample size can reach only 50, as that is the upper limit possible.
The two-inspection case has positive ENGS even if the operators have at most 2.4 times of the
original prior information, whereas the one-inspection case has positive ENGS when the prior
information is equal to or less than 1.6 times the original.
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Figure 7.5: Optimal sample size with different CF (CI = 3 and CP = 10)
7.5.4 Discussion
Major insights from the numerical-analysis results are as follows:
• The chance of a second inspection enhances the value of inspection at t1;
• Synergy between inspections at t1 and t2 is indicated;
• Regardless of the large population size, moderate inspection options, n(1) = 10, 20, 30, or
40, tend to be optimal within a wider range of CI , CP , and CF .
These insights indicate several findings for a general multiple-inspection problem when they
are combined with the insights in Section 6.5.2. When the inspection cost is low enough to obtain
benefit from reducing only aleatory uncertainty, at each inspection outage, operators should
inspect samples of maximum size until all components have been inspected. Once all un-inspected
components are inspected, the operators need to calculate the ENGS for each component, ignoring
parameter uncertainties, and inspect only the components that have positive ENGS. When the
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Figure 7.6: Optimal sample size with different amounts of prior information (CI = 3, CP = 10,
and CF = 100)
inspection cost is not low enough, the operators need to calculate ENGS for the overall components
and select the appropriate sample size for each inspection outage.
7.6 Generalized Multiple-Inspection Problem
This section generalizes the VoI-based SSD method to multiple-inspection problems as dynamic
programming equations.
7.6.1 Maintenance Stage





insp, xlast, and ∆tno. T
(i)












j=1 xj,insp; xlast is the latest observed degradation level of a single component; and ∆tno
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insp, update the estimation for the parameter of the degradation process,
µ, and the last two, xlast and ∆tno, affect the probability of failure in an inspection/maintenance
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In the inspection stage, we accumulate the expected cost for individual components and obtain










j , and if no component is inspected,































The expected pre-posterior cost for an un-inspected component is












The expected pre-posterior cost for an inspected component is
C
(i)












Thus, the ENGS(i) is derived as follows:
ENGS(i)(n(i)) = NC
(i)




Finally, the optimal sample size, n(i)o, is determined as follows:
n(i)o = arg max
n(i)
ENGS(i)(n(i)) (7.63)





a(i)o | e(i)o, n(i)o,Θ(i), θ(i)j
)
with the obtained n(i)o. Until the time horizon becomes t1,
the backward process is repeated. Once the process reaches t1, the most cost-effective
inspection/maintenance policy is proposed over the whole decision-making problem.
7.7 Summary
A statistical SSD method for system-level condition-based maintenance has been developed for
a two-inspection problem. This study has introduced how the VoI approach can be applied to
a multiple-inspection problem. The two-inspection problem is understood in the context of a
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general sequential decision problem with dynamic programming that indicates how to solve the
problem with backward induction. The analysis process has been formulated in a two-inspection
problem, and used to derive the definition of the ENGS. Numerical analysis with the data from
a real operating situation illustrates how the results support operators in their decision-making.
Based on the method for a two-inspection problem, the VoI-based SSD method is theoretically





Based on the value of information (VoI) concept, this thesis has formulated and developed
statistical sample size determination (SSD) methods for the maintenance of engineering
components that follow stochastic degradation process models. These methods provide an
inspection policy in a context of condition-based maintenance by defining maintenance problems
as sequential decision-making problems. The VoI-based methods are applied to two degradation
models: the random rate model and the gamma process model.
Various existing SSD methods are summarized, and their advantages and disadvantages are
discussed. Based on the classification, existing standards for engineering-components are then
categorized, and the rationale behind each standard is described. The categorization reveals
that the existing standards for SSD rely on deterministic criteria that are not theoretically
supported, or the criteria obtained through traditional SSD method: the hypothesis-testing
approach. This study compares the VoI-based method with the hypothesis-testing method by
formulating a situation in which traditional hypothesis-testing approaches have been used as a
Bayesian sequential-decision making problem. The stated problem uses a binomial component’s
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state, in what can be classified as a special case of the random rate model. The superiority of
the VoI-based approach is highlighted through conceptual, theoretical, and numerical analyses.
The VoI-based SSD method is applied to a degradation model, the random rate model.
Through formulating the VoI-based SSD method and demonstrating the model in a numerical
example, the advantages and the limitations of the random rate model are discussed.
Adding the gamma process to extend the model to condition-based maintenances enables
the VoI-based SSD method to be used in realistic maintenance and inspection problems. The
model mathematically describes how temporal and parameter uncertainties of the degradation
process affect VoI-based analysis. Because of the additivity characteristics of the gamma process,
the VoI-based SSD method can be formulated simply. To reduce computational costs, two
computational calculation techniques are introduced and applied to the proposed method. Their
costs and accuracies are compared, and the more effective method, the probability mass function
(PMF) approach, is used in the numerical analysis. An application to a real degrading system
demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach. The sensitivity of each parameter and the
contributions of the reducing parameter and temporal uncertainties are analysed and discussed.
For more-generalized condition-based maintenance applications, the thesis further extends the
model to a multiple-inspection problem by generalizing the model as a dynamic programming
problem. A problem with data from a real operating system is numerically analysed with a
two-inspection problem and shows how the first inspection subsequently affects maintenance and
second-inspection decisions. An optimal inspection and maintenance policy is proposed and
illustrated through the example.
The major insights found for sample size determination strategies are as follows:
• VoI-based SSD has advantages that can be shown qualitatively and quantitatively;
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• In most cases, a re-inspection has lower priority than a first-time-inspection;
• The optimal sample size is sensitive against parameters of cost and prior distribution;
• Reducing temporal uncertainty contributes to increasing ENGS, through the benefit from
inspected components;
• Reducing parameter uncertainty enhances ENGS, mostly from better estimations for
un-inspected components through parameter updating;
• The chance of a second inspection enhances the value of the first inspection.
8.2 Recommendations for Further Research
This study has several opportunities for expansion that warrant further research. First, latent
failure mode should be considered, to make the model applicable to several other fields, where not
only physical failures but also standard violations are important in the maintenance of operating
systems. Under stringent standards and regulations of operation, operators are actually concerned
about the penalty of finding latent failure in components, as this failure may raise concerns about
critical system failure, even though such components may still continue to work safely.
Second, the generalized model for multiple-inspection problems requires computationally
more-efficient techniques for numerical calculations than the proposed method. The maximum
number of time horizons of the current model has been roughly estimated as four, if the SSD
method for the four-inspection problem could be modelled as a simple extension of the current
model for a two-inspection problem. The challenge in solving the problem is to reduce the
computational cost of calculating high-dimensional integrations.
Third, cost functions should be investigated for more-realistic applications. In this study, the
costs of inspection, replacement, and failure are treated as fixed values for any situation; however,
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these costs can be functions of sample size, population size, or time. Moreover, if a system failure
may increase health risks to workers or residents around a site, human lives need to be estimated
in monetary terms to consider the cost-risk trade-off. The well-known value for human life is the
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Derivation of the EVSI and the ENGS:
Chapter 3
This section shows how to derive EV SI and ENGS in Equations (3.16) and (3.18), respectively.
The calculation for expected pre-posterior cost, shown in Equation (3.14), becomes
EW
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(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CF + wCP
]





(N − n)xb(CF − CP ) + (N − n)x̄′′(n,w)CP + wCP
]
· fW (w | n) (A.1)
Thus, the EVSI is derived as follows:
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[(N − n)x̄′′(n,w)(CF − CP )] · fW (w | n) if x̄ ≤ xb,
(A.2)
where we use
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The ENGS in Equation (3.18) is derived as follows:
ENGS (n)
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Appendix B
Posterior Distribution: Chapter 6
The likelihood function of µ is
L(µ | x(1)1 , x
(2)




































The posterior distribution for X is calculated using Bayes’ rule.
fM (µ | x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , · · · , x
(n)
1 ) =
L(µ | x(1)1 , x
(2)
1 , · · · , x
(n)
1 )fM (µ)∫∞










































































































1 is the sufficient statistics, the posterior distribution can be simplified as










Thus, operators only need to consider the sum of the inspected n components’ conditions, sn, for
updating the PDF of the unknown parameter, µ.
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Appendix C
Indices for Difference between Two
Distributions
This appendix introduces two indices, the histogram intersection and the Kulback-Leibler
divergence, which can represent difference between two distributions, especially for discrete
distributions.
C.1 Histogram Intersection
The simplest method to illustrate the similarity between two distributions is the histogram






where Qj(i) for j = 1, 2 is the probability mass for the ith interval. The index can take a value




The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence was first introduced by Kullback and Leibler (1951) as
a directed divergence between two distributions and has been used to evaluate how much one
distribution is different from another distribution. The KL divergence is one of the statistical
distance measures, which are mostly not metrics and not have to be symmetric. The KL
divergence for two discrete distributions, Q1 and Q2, is defined as follows:









Similarly, the KL divergence for two continuous distributions, q1(x) and q2(x), is defined as









For more detailed properties of the KL divergence, see Kullback (1968).
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